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INTRODUCTION
Blackstone, a private equity group, sponsors various
private equity funds, real estate funds and hedge funds.1
When Blackstone sponsors a fund, outside investors such as
pension
plans,
educational
endowments,
financial
institutions, and wealthy individuals agree to invest money in
the fund.2 Blackstone selects projects and securities in which
the fund will invest, and, in exchange for its efforts,
Blackstone receives a management fee plus a percentage of
the profits earned by the fund (referred to as carried
interest).3 In 2007, an entity named Blackstone Group LP
began trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).4
The Blackstone Group LP is an entity that is entitled to a
percentage of the payments Blackstone receives by way of
1. For further discussion, see Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX
L. REV. 89 (2008).
2. Id. at 97–98.
3. Id. at 94, 98.
4. See id. at 96–97.
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management fees and carried interest from the various funds
that it sponsors.5 Thus, anyone who buys an interest on the
NYSE in Blackstone Group LP is entitled to share in what
Blackstone receives as a fund sponsor.
Blackstone Group LP is publicly traded; yet, unlike many
publicly-traded companies, Blackstone Group LP is able to
avoid being treated as a corporation for tax purposes.6 Thus,
Blackstone Group LP is not required to pay corporate level
tax on all of its income and saves massive amounts in tax.
Blackstone Group LP benefits from this atypical tax
treatment as a result of complex tax structuring that relies on
many facets of tax law including the ability to electively
determine the tax treatment of various entities owned by
Blackstone Group LP. This complex structuring illustrates,
among other things, the ability of sophisticated taxpayers to
use tax elections to obtain favorable tax treatment.
Tax elections affect not only business entities but also
individual taxpayers. For example, if a divorced couple has a
child and various requirements are met, one of the parents
can claim the child as a dependent, and the parents electively
Moreover, although
decide which parent does so.7
sophisticated parties like Blackstone are able to save taxes by
making favorable elections, many unsophisticated taxpayers
who do not obtain adequate advice will fail to reap the
potential tax savings resulting from a beneficial election. In
the context of the dependency exemption election, for
instance, if a couple receives adequate advice, they can use
the election to reduce their total tax liability by deciding that
the parent who is subject to a higher tax rate will claim the
exemption.8 By contrast, an unsophisticated couple who is
unaware of the election may fail to obtain beneficial tax
treatment.9
Tax elections are prevalent. In addition to the entity
classification election upon which Blackstone relies and the
dependency exemption election just discussed, examples
include: elections by individual taxpayers to either claim the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 94, 98.
See id. at 97.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.C.
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standard deduction or itemize deductions; an election that
determines the tax treatment of alimony payments; and
elections that affect the tax consequences of certain corporate
transactions; just to name a few.
In order to obtain more favorable tax consequences as a
result of an election, a taxpayer can simply file a given
election and need not alter any of the nontax aspects of his or
her behavior or transactions. Thus, a sophisticated, welladvised taxpayer generally will have no reason to do anything
other than make the most advantageous election possible.
Consequently, only unsophisticated taxpayers who do not
obtain adequate advice will forgo the potential tax benefits of
an election. As a result, tax elections produce unfairness.10
Despite the unfairness they cause, tax elections remain.
In some cases, the continued existence of an election can only
be explained by the political influence of those who benefit
from it.11 In other cases, scholars have identified benign
justifications for an election.12 Ultimately, regardless of the
reason for a particular election’s endurance, at least some
elections are likely to continue to inhabit the tax landscape.
Given the inevitability of at least some tax elections, this
Article takes the approach of examining how elections can be
designed to mitigate the resulting harms. This Article
focuses, in particular, on four features that can be designed to
mitigate the unfairness caused by tax elections: (1) default
rules; (2) alerting taxpayers to the presence of an election; (3)
the deadline for filing an election; and (4) persistence.
Default rules determine the tax consequences that follow
when a taxpayer fails to make an election by the relevant
10. Tax elections are not the only examples of tax rules that are biased
against unsophisticated individuals. Other examples include opportunities to
engage in tax planning by changing nontax features of a planned transaction.
Like tax elections, these tax planning opportunities may disproportionately
benefit sophisticated taxpayers. For further discussion, see Emily Cauble,
Rethinking the Timing of Tax Decisions: Does a Taxpayer Ever Deserve a Second
Chance?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1013 (2012); Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax:
Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 22–24 (2010); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a
Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1319 (2001). While
many of the considerations discussed in this Article apply to this type of tax
planning as well, this Article focuses on explicit tax elections.
11. See infra note 126.
12. See infra Part III.
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deadline. Steps that could be taken to alert taxpayers to the
presence of an election include providing further information
on tax return forms and in tax return preparation software.
An election’s deadline specifies the time by which a taxpayer
must make an election. An election’s persistence refers to the
length of time during which any given election will affect tax
consequences.
A number of insightful articles about tax elections
already exist.13 Some articles even discuss how to design
features of elections, particularly default rules.14 This Article
builds upon the existing literature in three important ways.
First, before applying to tax law the analysis of default rules
that has developed in contract law, this Article describes how
the differences between tax law and contract law affect the
examination of default rules.
Ultimately, the relevant
differences between tax law and contract law relate to
important timing differences between making tax elections
and selecting contract provisions.
For example, one
noteworthy difference between tax law and contract law is the
time at which the government becomes involved. At the time
parties are establishing the terms of the contract, courts and
other governmental bodies are not involved. By contrast, in
tax law, the government, in the capacity of providing
information on tax return forms, is involved at the time the
parties make tax election decisions, at least for elections that
are filed at the same time as tax returns. Thus, although in
contract law it may be necessary or desirable to encourage
one contracting party to provide his or her counterparty with
13. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” 42 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 451 (2009); Field, supra note 10; Heather M. Field, Tax Elections &
Private Bargaining, 31 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2011); Aubree L. Helvey & Beth Stetson,
The Doctrine of Election, 62 TAX LAW. 333 (2008); Victoria A. Levin, The
Substantial Compliance Doctrine in Tax Law: Equity vs. Efficiency, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 1587 (1993); John MacArthur Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson’s Choice
and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1935);
Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30 VA.
TAX REV. 465 (2011); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer
Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009); George K.
Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions
Stimulated by the “Check-the-Box” Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125 (1997);
Edward Yorio, The Revocability of Federal Tax Elections, 44 FORDHAM L. REV.
463 (1975).
14. See, e.g., Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13;
Monroe, supra note 13, at 510–12; Raskolnikov, supra note 13, at 710–12.
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information about legal rules, in tax law, the IRS could
directly provide information to less informed taxpayers rather
than rely on other taxpayers as the source of information
about the law. A second noteworthy timing difference is that
contract terms are forward-looking while at least some tax
elections are backward-looking.15 Contract terms govern the
parties’ relationship going forward.16 Therefore, the parties
design a contract term based on what they anticipate will
occur after entering into a contract.17 Many tax elections, by
contrast, are backward-looking.18 Such elections govern tax
consequences for a year that has already closed before the
election must be filed. Thus, all information that determines
whether the election is beneficial is available at the time the
election is due. Because of this timing distinction, in many
cases, it will be difficult for a court to determine the
contractual term the parties would have wanted at the time
they entered into a contract but easy for courts or the IRS to
determine what election a taxpayer would have wanted as of
the due date for an election.
Second, this Article imports into the discussion of tax
election default rules a concept from contract law
scholarship—the notion of tailored default rules versus
untailored default rules—and uses this concept to make
further recommendations regarding tax election default
rules.19 A tailored default rule aims to exactly match what
the particular contracting parties would have wanted had
they considered a specific term, while an untailored default
rule might not match what any particular set of contracting
parties would have selected but rather represents what the
majority of contracting parties would desire.20 In contract
law, a tailored default rule is typically a vague, flexible
standard under which courts supply a term that would be
reasonable given the surrounding facts and circumstances.21
By contrast, an untailored default rule is usually a more
certain rule that represents what the majority of parties
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion.
See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion.
See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion.
See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion.
See infra Part IV.A.2.iii for further discussion.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
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might prefer but that, given its inflexible nature, does not
necessarily represent what any particular set of contracting
parties might have chosen.22 In contract law, the main
disadvantage of tailored default rules is the difficulty of
applying them given their vague nature. However, because of
the features that distinguish tax elections from contract law,
tailored default rules are often easy to apply in the tax
election context and can, in some cases, be quite useful.
Third, this Article explores how the interaction among
the various features of tax elections can simplify the task of
designing rules to protect unsophisticated taxpayers. For
example, although taxpayer-favorable default rules can
protect unsophisticated taxpayers, in some cases, it may be
difficult to select a default rule that will be favorable for all
taxpayers.
Nevertheless, in such a case, tax election
parameters can protect unsophisticated taxpayers because
later filing deadlines could allow more unsophisticated
taxpayers to make informed decisions with respect to the
election.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces and
discusses five elections used as examples throughout the
Article. Part II explains why elections are problematic, and
Part III discusses why elections continue to exist despite their
many flaws. Finally, Part IV explores how the features of
elections should be designed to mitigate the resulting harms.
I.

EXAMPLES OF TAX ELECTIONS

Hundreds of elections exist under current tax law in
areas including individual income tax,23 partnership tax,24
corporate tax,25 international tax,26 and estate tax.27 Tax
elections vary in a number of ways, two of which are
22. See infra Part IV.A.1.
23. Examples include several of the elections discussed in this paper. See
infra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C.
24. Examples include the elections available under §§ 704(c), 754 of the
Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 704(c), 754 (2012).
25. An example is the election in § 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue
Code discussed below. See infra Part I.E.
26. Examples include the election to either deduct foreign taxes or take a
foreign tax credit. See I.R.C. §§ 901(a), 164(a).
27. An example is the election to pay estate taxes in installments. See id.
§ 6166.
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significant for purposes of the recommendations made in this
Article. First, some tax elections are backward-looking, while
others are forward looking. Backward-looking tax elections
govern tax consequences for a year that has already closed
before the election must be filed. Thus, all information that
determines whether the election is beneficial is available at
the time the election is due. By contrast, forward-looking
elections continue to affect tax consequences in the future and
do not merely affect tax consequences for a year that has
already closed. Thus, at the time a taxpayer must make a
forward-looking election, he or she will not possess all
information relevant to assessing the pros and cons of making
the election. Second, tax elections vary because some tax
elections affect taxpayers whose interests are aligned, while
other tax elections affect taxpayers with divergent interests.
This part of the Article describes five elections that will
be used to illustrate recommendations made in later parts of
the Article. First, this part describes a backward-looking
election that affects taxpayers whose interests are aligned,
namely, the election by an individual taxpayer to either claim
the standard deduction or itemize deductions. Next, this part
describes two backward-looking elections that affect
taxpayers with divergent interests, namely, an election that
determines the tax treatment of alimony payments and an
election by divorced parents to determine which parent
claims a child as a dependent.28 The fourth election described
in this part, the entity classification election, is a forwardlooking election that affects taxpayers whose interests are
aligned.29 The final election described, the election under
§ 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code that affects the
tax consequences of certain contributions made to
corporations, is a forward-looking election that can affect
taxpayers whose interests diverge.

28. Professor Field provides the second and third examples as illustrations
for discussing the design of tax elections as well. See Field, Tax Elections &
Private Bargaining, supra note 13. I describe them here because of their
usefulness for illustrating the recommendations made later in this Article.
29. For a discussion of why the interests of the taxpayers are aligned, see
infra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
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A. The Standard Deduction vs. Itemizing Deductions
Every year, individual taxpayers choose between
claiming the standard deduction and itemizing deductions. If
an individual claims the standard deduction then, when
calculating his or her taxable income, that individual will
subtract the relevant standard deduction amount and
personal exemption amount from the individual’s adjusted
gross income (AGI).30 The standard deduction is a specific
dollar amount, adjusted annually for inflation.31 For 2012,
the standard deduction was $5950 for a single taxpayer and
$11,900 for married individuals filing joint returns.32 If a
taxpayer elects to itemize deductions then, in lieu of claiming
the standard deduction, that taxpayer will subtract from AGI
the dollar amount of certain expenses actually incurred by
the taxpayer, subject to certain limitations.33
Absent an election to itemize deductions, a taxpayer is
entitled to the standard deduction by default.34 Whether this
default rule is favorable depends on the amount of actual,
itemizable expenses incurred by the taxpayer. However, the
default rule is of limited importance because taxpayers are
given ample time and opportunity to elect out of the default
rule. If a taxpayer files a completed return, he or she will be
forced to make an affirmative choice because the taxpayer
will report a dollar amount on the relevant line of the return
equal to either the standard deduction amount or the total
amount of itemizable expenses.35 Moreover, the return form
30. AGI is, in turn, calculated by subtracting from a taxpayer’s gross income
various expenses such as certain trade or business expenses, alimony (unless, as
described infra Part I.B, the individual does not deduct alimony), and other
expenses listed in § 62 of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 62.
31. I.R.C. § 63(c)(4).
32. Rev. Proc. 2011-52 § 3.11(1), 2011-45 I.R.B. 701. The standard
deduction is also subject to certain other adjustments. For example, it is
increased for aged and blind taxpayers. I.R.C. §§ 63(c)(1)(B), (c)(3), (f).
33. I.R.C. § 63. Certain expenses, such as medical expenses and the
charitable contribution deduction, are subject to item-specific limitations. See
id. §§ 213, 170. Furthermore, certain items are deductible only to the extent
that the aggregate of those items exceeds two percent of the taxpayer’s AGI. Id.
§ 67. In addition, except for certain items like medical expenses, when a
taxpayer’s AGI exceeds a given threshold, allowable itemized deductions will be
phased out. Id. § 68.
34. Id. § 63(b).
35. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN
FORM 1040 at line 40 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
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itself alerts taxpayers to the fact that a choice is being
made,36 and the instructions accompanying the form provide
advice to guide taxpayers in making the selection.37
The standard deduction default rule is significant only if
a taxpayer fails to file a completed return, and the IRS
prepares and files a substitute return based on information
available to the IRS (such as information provided by
employers and other third parties).38 This substitute return
would calculate taxable income based on the standard
deduction.39 However, even in this instance, only a persistent
failure to act would preclude the taxpayer from itemizing
deductions.
When the taxpayer receives notice of the
substitute return, the taxpayer can file his or her own return
on which he or she can itemize deductions. The return filed
by the taxpayer would be treated as a request for audit
reconsideration and would replace the substitute return if
accepted by the IRS.40
Regarding deadlines, the election must be made on a
taxpayer’s return filed for the relevant year—therefore, the
election is due when the tax return is due.41 The advantages
and disadvantages of itemizing deductions depend only on the
expenses incurred by the taxpayer and income earned by the
taxpayer in a year that will have closed before the election
must be made. Thus, at the time the taxpayer makes the
election, he or she will possess all information relevant to
pdf/f1040.pdf.
36. Form 1040, line 40, states that a taxpayer should provide: “Itemized
deduction (from Schedule A) or your standard deduction (see left margin).” Id.
(emphasis omitted). The left margin then lists the relevant dollar amounts for
the standard deduction, and Schedule A and its instructions walk the taxpayer
through the process for calculating itemized deductions. See id.
37. Instructions to Form 1040 state the following regarding line 40: “In most
cases, your federal income tax will be less if you take the larger of your itemized
deduction or standard deductions.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS
FOR FORM 1040 at 37–38 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i1040gi.pdf. The instructions then refer the taxpayer to Schedule A for
guidance regarding calculating itemized deductions and continue by describing
how the taxpayer can determine the standard deduction amount. See id. at 38.
38. I.R.C. § 6020(b) (providing IRS with authority to prepare substitute
returns).
39. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRM 4.10.4.3 (Aug. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-010-004.html#d0e470.
40. See IINTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRM 4.13.1.7(1)(B) (Oct. 1, 2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-013-001.html#d0e166.
41. I.R.C. § 63(e)(2).
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assessing its effects. Furthermore, the taxpayer may change
the election on an amended tax return filed within the period
of the statute of limitations for claiming a tax refund.42
Finally, regarding persistence, the election only affects
the tax results of the year that has already closed. The
taxpayer may make a different decision for any future year.
Overall the parameters of the election are quite generous.
Taxpayers are given substantial time to make and revise the
election. Tax return forms provide information regarding the
pros and cons of making the election, and taxpayers are
entitled to make a new election every year.43 These taxpayerfavorable parameters likely reflect the understanding that
many unsophisticated taxpayers must choose between
claiming the standard deduction and itemizing deductions.44
Also, the parameters may emanate from the fact that one
purpose of the election is to allow taxpayers to avoid the chore
of keeping track of itemized deductions.45 To not undermine
this goal of promoting simplicity, the process for making the
election should, itself, be simple.
B. Alimony
Another election relevant to some individual taxpayers
affects the treatment of alimony.
By default, alimony
payments are included in the income of the spouse receiving
alimony46 and deducted by the spouse paying alimony.47
However, if both spouses agree, in lieu of following the default
treatment, the recipient will exclude the payments from
income, and the payor will not deduct the payments.48
In the typical case, the default rule is favorable to
taxpayers. The default rule is advantageous if the spouse
42. Id. § 63(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.63-1 (2012); I.R.C. § 6511.
43. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
44. See Patricia A. Jendraszek, Comment, An Analysis of the Status of
Amended Tax Returns and the Effects of their Use, 23 HOUS. L. REV. 769, 797
(1986).
45. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
46. I.R.C. § 71(a).
47. Id. § 215(a).
48. Id. § 71(b)(1)(B). Some aspects of the tax treatment of payments in
divorce depend on implicit tax planning rather than explicit tax elections. For
further discussion, see, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Simplifying and Rationalizing
the Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to Transfers in Divorce, 55 TAX LAW.
363 (2002).
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paying alimony is in a higher tax bracket than the spouse
receiving alimony, which is often true because the spouse
paying alimony usually earns more income than the spouse
receiving alimony. In order to demonstrate, assume the
payor is subject to a thirty-five percent tax rate, the recipient
is subject to a twenty-five percent tax rate, and the amount of
alimony paid is $50,000. By deducting alimony, the payor
incurs tax liability that is $17,500 lower than the liability he
or she would have incurred absent the deduction. At the
same time, by including the payment in income, the recipient
becomes subject to tax liability that is $12,500 higher than
the liability to which he or she would have been subject
without this income.49 Thus, the aggregate tax liability of the
parties under the default rule is $5000 lower than the
aggregate tax liability that would have resulted had the
parties elected out of the default rule. Moreover, both
spouses could share in this aggregate benefit if the spouse
paying alimony increases the amount paid in order to shift
some of the benefit of the tax deduction to the spouse
receiving alimony.50 If the spouse receiving alimony was
subject to a higher tax rate than the paying spouse, the

49. For simplicity, these calculations assume that including the payment in
income (or deducting the payment) is not sufficient to move the paying spouse
or receiving spouse into a different marginal tax bracket.
50. See Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13, at 10–11.
For example, assume the paying spouse is subject to a thirty-five percent tax
rate, the receiving spouse is subject to a twenty-five percent tax rate, and the
parties would have agreed to alimony payments of $50,000 if they opted out of
the default treatment. Retaining the default treatment and increasing the
amount of the payment to $70,000 can improve the economic position of both
individuals. If the payment was $50,000 and the parties opted out of the
default treatment, the paying spouse would incur a $50,000 after-tax loss (he or
she pays $50,000 and is not entitled to a deduction). The receiving spouse
would achieve a $50,000 after-tax gain (he or she receives $50,000 and is not
subject to tax on the payment). If the payment is increased to $70,000 and the
parties do not opt out of default treatment, the paying spouse would incur a
$45,500 after-tax loss ($50,000 pre-tax payment minus $24,500 tax savings
resulting from deducting the payment from income taxed at thirty-five percent).
Thus, the paying spouse’s economic position is improved by $4500. The
receiving spouse would achieve a $52,500 after-tax gain ($70,000 payment
minus $17,500 tax liability incurred as a result of taxing the payment at
twenty-five percent). Thus, the receiving spouse’s economic position is improved
by $2500. For simplicity, these calculations assume that including the payment
in income (or deducting the payment) is not sufficient to move the paying spouse
or receiving spouse into a different marginal tax bracket.
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parties would benefit from making the election so that
alimony was excluded from the income of the recipient and
not deducted by the payor.
The parties make the election by designating the
payment as not includible in gross income and not allowable
as a deduction in the “divorce or separation instrument.”51
The divorce or separation instrument can include any writing
signed by both parties that refers to their written separation
agreement.52 A copy of this signed writing must be attached
to the recipient’s first filed tax return for each year in which
the election out of default treatment applies.53 Because the
election can be made in a writing attached to the recipient’s
return, the parties can decide whether to make the election
each year after the year is closed. At that time, the parties
will have all the information required to determine whether
the election is advantageous.
Regarding persistence, the parties can change the
election every year.54 Thus, if the relative circumstances of
the parties change so that a different party is in a higher tax
bracket in any given year, the parties can change the election
to achieve more favorable tax consequences.
C. Divorced Parents and the Dependency Exemption
Another election relevant to divorced couples determines
which parent takes a dependency exemption for a child. If a
divorced couple has a child and various requirements are met,
then one of the parents can claim the child as a dependent,
and the parents electively decide which parent does so.55
Regarding the default rule, if no election is made to the
contrary, the “custodial parent” takes the exemption.56 The
51. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B).
52. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b) Q&A-8 (2011).
53. Id. Attaching the agreement to an amended return would not be
effective. See CINDY L. WOFFORD, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., TAX
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO: DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, 515-2ND, at II.D.8.
54. Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13, at 10 (citing
WOFFORD, supra note 53).
55. For either of the parents to claim the child as a dependent for a given
year, for example, the child must not have provided over one-half of his or her
own support for that year, and, unless the child is disabled, he or she must be
younger than nineteen (or a student younger than twenty-four). See I.R.C.
§ 152(c)(1)(C)–(D).
56. Id. § 152(c)(1)(B), (c)(4)(B)(i).

CAUBLE FINAL

434

7/23/2013 9:23 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

custodial parent is the parent who has custody of the child for
the greater portion of the calendar year.57 The parties can
affirmatively elect for the noncustodial parent to take the
exemption instead.58 To make this election for any given
year, the custodial parent must sign a written declaration
stating that he or she will not claim the child as a dependent
for that year, and the noncustodial parent must attach this
declaration to his or her return for that year.59 The default
rule will be favorable if the custodial parent is subject to a
higher tax rate than the noncustodial parent, but, when the
reverse is true, the default rule is unfavorable.60 It is unclear
whether the default rule is more commonly favorable or
unfavorable because a parent may have custody for any
number of reasons that do not necessarily bear any relation to
that parent’s income (and thus marginal tax bracket).61
Regarding its deadline, the election must be filed by the
due date for the noncustodial parent’s tax return.62 By the
time the election is due, all relevant information will be
available because the benefits of the election depend on the
taxpayers’ income for the year that will have already closed
before the election must be filed.
Finally, regarding
persistence, the election only needs to affect the year that is
already closed because a different election may be made each
year.63
57. Id. §152(e)(4)(A).
58. Id. § 152(e).
59. Id. § 152(e)(2).
60. In some cases, other factors affect the analysis, such as the phase-out of
the exemption at high income levels. See Field, Tax Elections & Private
Bargaining, supra note 13, at 12.
61. See id. at 65–66.
62. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2). If taxpayers later discover that a different election
would have been more favorable, it is likely that they cannot change the election
merely by amending their tax returns. Occasionally, a statute expressly allows
a taxpayer to change an election in an amended return. This is true, for
instance, regarding the election between taking the standard deduction and
itemizing deductions. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. If a statute
does not explicitly grant this right, taxpayers generally cannot change elections
in amended returns unless: (i) the amended return is filed before the due date
for the original return, (ii) the election is consistent with how the taxpayer
reported items on the original return, or (iii) the election made on the original
return was improper. See Jendraszek, supra note 44, at 796–98.
63. The written declaration signed by the custodial parent may release the
exemption for only a single year or for more than one (or all) future years.
Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(e)(1) (2012). If the custodial parent releases the
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D. The Entity Classification Election
Turning from the world of individual taxpayers to the
business arena, one election available to many business
entities determines how those entities are classified for tax
purposes. While certain business entities must be treated as
corporations for tax purposes,64 under the check-the-box
regulations, many business entities are allowed to elect their
tax classification.65 If a business entity has two or more
owners and is allowed to elect its classification, it may elect to
be treated as either a partnership or a corporation for tax
purposes.66 If a business entity has one owner and is allowed
to elect its classification, it may elect to be treated as either a
disregarded entity or a corporation for tax purposes.67
An entity’s classification significantly affects the tax
treatment of the entity and its owners.68 If an entity is
treated as a corporation for tax purposes, generally the entity
will be subject to entity-level tax.69 In addition, tax losses
recognized by the entity may be used to reduce its own
taxable income but cannot be taken into account directly by
the entity’s owners.70 Furthermore, owners of the entity may
be subject to tax when they sell ownership interests in the

exemption for more than the current year, the custodial parent may revoke the
release by providing the noncustodial parent with written notice. Such a
revocation would be effective no earlier than the year after the year in which
the custodial parent provides written notice or makes reasonable efforts to
provide written notice. Id. § 1.152-4(e)(3). However, presumably the revocation
could be effective earlier if the noncustodial parent agrees.
64. Certain entities (per se corporations) are automatically treated as
corporations for U.S. tax purposes. See id. § 301.7701-2(b). Such entities
include, among others, (i) entities that are organized under a Federal or State
statute that describes or refers to the entity as incorporated or as a corporation,
and (ii) publicly-traded partnerships that do not earn predominately qualifying
income. See id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), (b)(7); I.R.C. § 7704. Per se corporations are
not allowed to elect to be treated as pass-through entities. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(a) (providing that only eligible entities—or entities that are not
per se corporations—can elect their tax classification).
65. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. For a more complete discussion of the effects of entity classification, see
generally WILLIAM P. STRENG, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., TAX
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO: CHOICE OF ENTITY, 700-3RD, II–XIV.
69. I.R.C. § 11(b).
70. Id.
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entity or receive certain distributions from the entity.71 If an
entity is treated as a partnership for tax purposes or is
disregarded as separate from its owner for tax purposes, the
entity will not be subject to tax. Instead, any items of tax
income, gain, loss or deduction recognized by the entity will
be passed through to the entity’s owner(s) for the owner(s) to
take into account directly when computing their own taxable
income.72 Thus, treatment as a corporation generally involves
two levels of tax, in particular both an entity-level tax and an
owner-level tax.73 By contrast, treatment as a partnership or
a disregarded entity (referred to collectively as pass-through
entities) involves only one level of tax, the tax imposed at the
owner level.74 Consequently, classification as a pass-through
entity typically involves a lesser tax burden than
classification as a corporation.
However, corporate tax
treatment is more favorable in some cases.75
If an entity is formed in the United States and is eligible
to elect its tax treatment, the entity will receive pass-through
treatment unless an election is filed to treat the entity as a
corporation.76 This pass-through default rule is typically, but
not always, favorable.77
Regarding its deadline, an entity classification election
must be filed no later than seventy-five days after the desired
effective date for the election (which, in many cases, means
seventy-five days after the entity is formed).78 However, in
71. Id. §§ 301, 1001 (regarding distributions and gain from sale of
ownership interests, respectively).
72. Id. § 701.
73. See id. § 11(b).
74. See id. § 701.
75. For an example of a situation in which treatment as a corporation would
be more favorable, see infra note 88 and accompanying text. In addition, in
some cases, treatment as an S Corporation could be more favorable than
treatment as a partnership, and an entity will not be treated as an S
Corporation absent an affirmative election to be treated as an S Corporation.
76. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (2012). The default rules for non-U.S.
entities are different. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2).
77. See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text.
78. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iii) (providing that the election can be
effective no earlier than seventy-five days before it is filed). This often means
that the election must be filed within seventy-five days of an entity’s formation
because changes to an existing entity’s classification could have negative tax
consequences in some cases. For example, see infra note 100 and accompanying
text.
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some cases, relief may be granted to file the election late. In
particular, if the entity requests relief for a late election
within three years and seventy-five days of the desired
effective date, the IRS will automatically grant relief if: (1)
the entity failed to obtain its preferred classification solely
because the relevant form was not filed in a timely manner,
(2) the entity either has not yet filed a tax return or has filed
returns consistent with its preferred classification, and (3) the
entity has reasonable cause for its failure to timely file the
election.79
Because of these three requirements, a taxpayer’s
prospects for obtaining relief will be fairly bleak unless, prior
to the original seventy-five day deadline, the taxpayer had
decided upon the classification that the taxpayer now seeks
and failed to file the election merely as a result of a minor
error, such as a miscommunication regarding who would file
the election.80 A taxpayer who failed to even consider the
availability of the election is unlikely to obtain relief to file a
late election.81 Also, a taxpayer will be precluded from filing a
late election if he or she decided to treat the entity one way
and now seeks to file an election to treat it differently in order
to benefit from hindsight.82 In other words, the taxpayer may
not file a late election because unanticipated economic results
of the underlying business or other information that has come
to the taxpayer’s attention since the original seventy-five day
deadline make the alternate classification more favorable. If
the taxpayer is not entitled to automatic relief for filing a late
election, the taxpayer must request a private letter ruling to
79. See Rev. Proc. 2009-41, 2009-39 I.R.B. 4.01 (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2009-39_IRB/ar17.html#d0e6036.
80. Courts are most likely to grant relief for late filing of elections under
these facts, which suggests that reasonable cause should be interpreted to refer
to situations involving minor error or similar facts. For a discussion of when
courts grant relief, see MICHAEL B. LANG & COLLEEN A. KHOURY, FEDERAL TAX
ELECTIONS ¶ 2.02 (1991); Yorio, supra note 13, at 475–76.
81. A taxpayer who failed to consider the election likely does not have
reasonable cause for its failure to file, based on when courts grant relief for late
filing. For a discussion of when courts grant relief, see LANG & KHOURY, supra
note 80, ¶ 2.02[3] ; Yorio, supra note 13, at 476–78.
82. A taxpayer who is attempting to benefit from hindsight likely does not
have reasonable cause for its failure to file, based on when courts grant relief for
late filing. For a discussion of when courts grant relief, see LANG & KHOURY,
supra note 80, ¶ 2.02[3]; Yorio, supra note 13, at 478.
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obtain relief.83 Requesting a private letter ruling is a costly
proposition.84 In addition, restrictions on the ability to obtain
a private letter ruling are similar to the limitations placed on
automatic extensions of time.85
In some cases, whether pass-through treatment is
favorable depends on the economic results achieved by the
business, which will be unknown before the due date for filing
an election. Therefore, taxpayers may have to make an entity
classification decision before all relevant information is
available. In other words, unlike the backward-looking tax
elections in the individual taxpayer context discussed
previously,86 the entity classification election is a forwardlooking election. As a result, taxpayers may make entity
classification decisions that seem favorable but prove to be
unfavorable in retrospect.
For example, assume a group of tax-exempt entities (such
as private employer-sponsored pension plans, educational
endowments, and private foundations) plan to invest in a real
estate fund that intends to buy and sell for-sale housing (such
as condominiums) in non-U.S. countries that tax income at a
rate lower than the U.S. corporate tax rate. If the tax-exempt
entities owned interests in an entity treated as a partnership
for U.S. tax purposes and that entity, in turn, owned the forsale housing, the tax-exempt entities generally would bear a
combined U.S. and non-U.S. effective tax rate equivalent to
the U.S. corporate tax rate on gains recognized from the for-

83. See Rev. Proc. 2009-41, 2009-39 I.R.B. 4.01 (2009); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.9100-3(e)(5). A private letter ruling is written guidance issued by the IRS
to a particular taxpayer.
84. See Helvey & Stetson, supra note 13, at 355 (stating that the minimum
filing fee is $625 along with the fees for hiring a tax professional).
85. For instance, the IRS will deny a taxpayer a favorable letter ruling if the
taxpayer decided to treat the entity one way and now seeks a ruling in order to
file an election to treat it differently to benefit from hindsight. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.9100-3(b)(3)(iii). Also, a taxpayer who failed to seek advice about an
election prior to the seventy-five day deadline is unlikely to obtain a favorable
letter ruling. This is true because, in order to obtain relief, the taxpayer must
have acted reasonably and in good faith. Id. § 301.9100-3(a). The regulations
list several circumstances in which a taxpayer is generally deemed to have so
acted. See id. § 301.9100-3(b)(1). None of the circumstances seem to
contemplate a situation in which the taxpayer obtained no information about
the election prior to the original filing deadline.
86. See supra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C.
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sale housing.87 If the tax-exempt entities, instead, invested in
a non-U.S. entity treated as a corporation for U.S. tax
purposes and that entity owned the for-sale housing, the taxexempt entities generally would bear an effective tax rate
equal to the non-U.S. tax rate (assumed to be lower than the
U.S. corporate tax rate, as stated above).88 Consequently,
87. Tax-exempt entities are generally not subject to U.S. tax. However,
under the unrelated business income tax (UBIT), tax-exempt entities are
subject to U.S. tax on income earned from certain activities and investments.
See I.R.C. §§ 501, 511–14 (2012). The UBIT requires that a tax-exempt pay tax
at regular corporate rates (or at rates generally applicable to taxable trusts in
the case of tax-exempt entities that are trusts) on income derived from a trade
or business regularly carried on by the tax-exempt and not substantially related
to its exempt purpose. See id. §§ 511–13. The activities of a partnership are
attributed to its partners for purposes of determining whether a tax-exempt
partner realizes income subject to the UBIT as a result of an investment in a
partnership. Therefore, if a partnership engages in an activity that would be an
unrelated trade or business if a tax-exempt partner engaged in the activity
directly, income allocated to the tax-exempt partner by the partnership with
respect to such activity will be subject to the UBIT.
Id. § 512(c)(1).
Consequently, when a partnership sells for-sale housing, gain from the for-sale
housing allocated to a tax-exempt partner is subject to the UBIT because the
tax-exempt partner would recognize income subject to the UBIT if it bought and
sold for-sale housing directly, assuming it was not substantially related to its
exempt purpose. If a tax-exempt entity subject to thirty-five percent UBIT (the
corporate rate) invests in a partnership that sells for-sale housing in a non-U.S.
country with a tax rate of twenty-eight percent and the housing generates a
gain of which the tax-exempt entity’s share is $100, the tax-exempt entity will
bear a total tax burden of thirty-five dollars. The tax-exempt entity’s share of
non-U.S. tax is twenty-eight dollars, and the tax-exempt entity’s share of U.S.
tax is seven dollars (thirty-five dollars of UBIT minus twenty-eight dollars of
foreign tax credits). Thus, the total effective tax rate is thirty-five percent (the
corporate rate).
88. Certain types of income are generally not subject to the UBIT. Id.
§ 512(b). Such income includes dividends and capital gain income. Id. Special
rules apply if the income is debt-financed. Id. § 514. If the tax-exempt entities
hold interests in an entity treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, the
income they earn from the entity will consist of dividends and capital gain
income, generally not subject to the UBIT as long as the tax-exempt entities’
interests in the corporation are not debt-financed. Furthermore, because the
income earned by the non-U.S. corporation (gain from sale of non-U.S. real
estate) is generally not subject to U.S. tax when earned by a non-U.S. person
such as a non-U.S. corporation, the non-U.S. corporation will not be subject to
corporate-level U.S. tax. As a result, the only tax burden borne by the taxexempt entities will be their share of non-U.S. tax imposed by the country in
which the real estate is located. Thus, assuming the non-U.S. tax rate is lower
than the UBIT rate, the tax-exempt entities bear a lower tax burden as a result
of investing through a non-U.S. corporation than as a result of investing
through a partnership. For further discussion of structuring opportunities and
real estate funds, see Richard M. Nugent, Possible Approaches for Avoiding
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assuming the parties anticipate that the for-sale housing will
be sold at a gain, the tax-exempt entities will expect to benefit
from more favorable tax consequences if they invest through
a non-U.S. entity treated as a corporation for U.S. tax
purposes. Thus, assuming the tax-exempt entities invest
through a non-U.S. entity that is treated as a partnership for
U.S. tax purposes by default,89 the tax-exempt entities will
file an election to treat the entity as a corporation effective as
of the date of formation.
Suppose that, after the for-sale housing projects are
completed and sold, the tax-exempt entities learn that the
housing projects, contrary to their expectations, generated
economic and tax losses. As a result, the tax-exempt entities
would have realized more favorable tax consequences if the
non-U.S. entity that held the housing projects had been
treated as a partnership, rather than a corporation, for U.S.
tax purposes.90 Thus, if they were able to do so, the parties
would file an amended election to treat the entity as a
partnership, effective retroactively as of a date before the
underlying assets accrued losses. However, existing law
precludes the parties from filing such an election because it
would represent an attempt to benefit from hindsight.91
Regarding the persistence of the election, absent a
significant change in ownership of the entity,92 classification

UBTI on Real Estate Investments, 97 TAX NOTES 271 (2002).
89. If it has two or more members and at least one member does not have
limited liability, a non-U.S. entity that is eligible to elect its classification will
be treated as a partnership by default. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(A). Thus,
assuming that the tax-exempt entities invest in a non-U.S. entity in which one
owner has unlimited liability, such as the foreign equivalent of a limited
partnership, the entity will be treated as a partnership unless an election is
filed to treat it as a corporation.
90. If the entity had been treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes,
when it sold the housing projects, each tax-exempt partner would be allocated
its share of unrelated business losses resulting from the sale. Each tax-exempt
partner could deduct the resulting losses against other unrelated business
taxable income, subject to certain limitations. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.512(a)-1(a). By contrast, if the entity is treated as a corporation for U.S. tax
purposes, losses that it recognizes will not flow through to the tax-exempt
entities.
91. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
92. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) (If more than fifty percent of the
interests in the entity change hands, an earlier elective change in classification
is possible).
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elections can only be changed every five years.93 However, if
an entity is initially classified by default, there is no limit on
how soon it could make a first change to its classification.94
Also, if an entity files an election that is effective as of the
date the entity was formed (an initial classification election),
there is no restriction on how soon the entity could elect to
make a first change to its classification.95
Even if the five-year rule prevents an entity from making
an explicit election to change its classification, the entity
could carry out a transaction that likely achieves the same
result.96 Assume, for example, a U.S. entity with two owners
files an election to be classified as a corporation effective one
day after the date of formation. This entity would not be
allowed to file an election to be treated as a partnership
effective earlier than five years and one day after the entity’s
formation. However, before that date, this entity could
distribute all of its assets to its owners in liquidation, and the
owners could, in turn, contribute the assets to a newly formed
entity treated as a partnership for tax purposes.97
Finally, any change, elective or otherwise, will affect an
entity’s classification prospectively but not retroactively
(except that, in the case of an elective change, the effective
date could be up to seventy-five days before the election is
filed). As noted above, whether any classification decision
will prove to be favorable may depend, at least in part, on the
economic results of the underlying business that are
unknown at the time the decision is made. Furthermore,
because any change in classification will be largely
93. Id.
94. Id. The five-year limitation only applies if an entity makes an election,
thus classification by default would not trigger the five-year limitation. Id.
95. Id. “An election by a newly formed eligible entity that is effective on the
date of formation” does not trigger the five-year limitation. Id.
96. Professor Field also makes this observation. See Field, Checking in on
“Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at n.287.
97. These transactions could effectively mimic the results of an elective
change to the entity’s classification because, under the Treasury Regulations,
when an existing corporation elects to be treated as a partnership for tax
purposes, the following transactions are deemed to occur: (i) the corporation
distributes all of its assets to its shareholders in liquidation, and (ii) the
shareholders contribute all of the assets to a newly formed partnership. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(ii). Thus, this strategy could be effective unless the IRS
successfully argues that the new entity should be treated as a mere
continuation of the old entity for tax purposes.
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prospective, the flexibility to change the entity’s classification
upon discovering unexpected economic results will not
necessarily save the taxpayers from having made an election
that proves to be unfavorable. For instance, in the example
discussed above,98 when the tax-exempt entities discover that
the real estate fund’s assets have fallen in value, they might
file an election to change the real estate fund’s classification
to partnership. The five-year rule would not prevent such a
change given that the earlier election to treat the fund as a
corporation was an initial classification election that does not
trigger the five-year limitation.99 However, filing a change of
election does not save the tax-exempt entities from the
unexpectedly negative tax consequences. This is the case
because the negative tax consequences will still occur as a
result of the fact that the fund was treated as a corporation
from the date of formation until the effective date of this later
elective change in classification.100
E. The § 362(e)(2)(C) Election
Section 362(e)(2)(C) contains another election relevant in
the business context: when a shareholder, or group of
shareholders, contributes property to a corporation in
exchange for stock, the shareholder(s) will not recognize the
gain or loss built into the property as long as the contributing
shareholder(s) own a controlling interest in the corporation
immediately after the contribution.101 To ensure that any
built-in gain or loss is recognized at the time of a future
transaction, the built-in gain or loss will be preserved.

98. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
100. If the election is effective after losses have accrued, the losses will be
recognized by the corporation as a result of a deemed liquidation of the
corporation and, therefore, the losses will not flow through to the tax-exempt
entities. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(ii) (providing that, as a result of the
elective change, the corporation will be deemed to distribute all of its assets to
the shareholders in liquidation and the shareholders will be deemed to
contribute all the assets to a newly formed partnership); I.R.C. § 336(a) (2012)
(providing that a corporation will generally recognize losses as a result of a
liquidation, so that the corporation would recognize the built-in losses at the
time of the deemed liquidation resulting from the elective change in
classification).
101. I.R.C. § 351.
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For example, assume an individual acquires a parcel of
land for $100. Over time, the value of the land decreases to
seventy-five dollars. The individual contributes the land to a
newly formed corporation in exchange for all of the
corporation’s stock. The individual will not recognize any tax
loss as a result of this exchange.102 Under law that existed
prior to 2004, the individual’s basis in the stock received
would be $100 (the same as the individual’s basis in the
land),103 and the corporation’s basis in the land would be $100
(the same as the individual’s basis in the land).104 Thus, if the
individual were to sell the stock for seventy-five dollars, the
individual would recognize a twenty-five dollar tax loss.
Likewise, if the corporation sold the land for seventy-five
dollars, the corporation would recognize a twenty-five dollar
tax loss. Therefore, the individual would have incurred one
twenty-five dollar economic loss (having acquired land that
decreased in value by twenty-five dollars), but, rather than
sell the land directly and recognize only one twenty-five
dollar tax loss, the individual could create two twenty-five
dollar tax losses—one to be recognized by the individual and
one to be recognized by the corporation.
In 2004, Congress enacted legislation to combat the
prospect of an individual contributing built-in loss property to
a corporation in order to extract two tax losses from one
economic loss.105 Under rules in effect since 2004, the built-in
However,
loss may be preserved at only one level.106
taxpayers can decide whether to preserve the loss at the
shareholder level or at the corporate level.107 In particular, if
no election is filed, the built-in loss will be preserved at the
shareholder level only.108 Thus, in the example above, the
individual’s basis in the stock would be $100 (preserving a
twenty-five dollar built-in loss in the stock), but the
corporation’s basis in the land would be seventy-five dollars
102. Id. § 351(a).
103. Id. § 358(a)(1).
104. Id. § 362(a).
105. For an additional discussion, see Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn,
Prevention of Double Deductions of a Single Loss: Solutions in Search of a
Problem, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2006).
106. I.R.C. § 362(e)(2).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 362(e)(2)(A).
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(preserving no built-in loss in the land). However, if the
individual and the corporation both make an election under
§ 362(e)(2)(C), the built-in loss will be preserved at the
corporate level only.109 In the example above, if such an
election were made, the individual’s basis in the stock would
be seventy-five dollars (preserving no built-in loss in the
stock), but the corporation’s basis in the land would be $100
(preserving a twenty-five dollar built-in loss in the land).
As just described, in the case of the § 362(e)(2)(C)
election, the default rule is to preserve the loss at the
shareholder level rather than the corporate level. Whether
this default rule is favorable depends on many facts,
including: whether the corporation recognizes tax gains that
could be offset by a tax loss recognized on sale of the
contributed property (or offset by depreciation if the
contributed property is a depreciable asset), whether the
shareholder recognizes tax gains that could be offset by a tax
loss recognized on sale of the stock, when the corporation sells
the contributed property, and when the shareholder sells the
stock.110 Moreover, these facts will often be unknown at the
time the election must be made. Thus, taxpayers will have to
make predictions in order to decide what route is favorable.
Making an election under § 362(e)(2)(C) is likely to lead
to lower aggregate tax liability taking into account the time
value of money (and the default rule is likely to be
unfavorable) if the corporation recognizes sufficient taxable
income to utilize tax deductions and if either the contributed
property is depreciable or the corporation is likely to sell the
property before the shareholder sells the stock. In such a
case, making an election would reduce the aggregate tax
liability of the shareholder and the corporation, taking into
account the time value of money. If the corporation has more
owners than just the shareholder contributing the property,
then the benefit of the lower corporate-level tax burden may
accrue to all the shareholders (not just the contributing
shareholder). Nevertheless, the contributing shareholder
may still agree to make the election if he or she is adequately
109. See id. § 362(e)(2)(C).
110. All of these facts are relevant because the election determines whether
the corporation has a higher basis in an asset or the shareholder has a higher
stock basis.
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compensated by the other shareholders.
Regarding the deadline for this election, the contributing
shareholder must provide a signed certificate making the
election by the due date for the shareholder’s original tax
return for the year in which the property contribution
occurred.111 If a taxpayer seeks to file the election late, he or
she is unlikely to obtain relief to do so unless he or she
requests relief within six months of the due date for filing the
original tax return.112 As mentioned above, the advisability of
making the election depends on future events.
Thus,
taxpayers will not have all relevant information at the time
the election is made, and, like the entity classification
election, the § 362(e)(2)(C) election is forward-looking.
Regarding persistence, once made, the § 362(e)(2)(C) election
is irrevocable.113
II. WHY TAX ELECTIONS ARE PROBLEMATIC
Existing scholarship criticizes tax elections for a number
of reasons. First, elections erode tax revenue if taxpayers
make elections wisely.114 A taxpayer can simply file a given
election and obtain more favorable tax consequences without
altering any of the nontax aspects of his or her behavior or
transactions. Thus, a taxpayer who uses the election wisely
will generally make whatever choice leads to the least

111. Notice 2005-70, 2005-41 I.R.B. Elections Under § 362(e)(2)(C), available
at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2005-41_IRB/ar12.html.
112. Section 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code election is a
regulatory election as its due date is provided by a notice. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.9100-1(b) (2012). Thus, the guidelines for requesting an extension of time
to make the election are contained in sections 301.9100-2 and 301.9100-3 of the
Treasury Regulations. Given that the election is not listed in section 301.91002(a)(2), section 301.9100-2(b) would govern a taxpayer’s ability to obtain an
automatic extension of time. Under that provision, if the taxpayer timely filed a
tax return for the year in which the contribution occurred, the taxpayer would
be able to file a late election automatically as long as it is filed within six
months of the due date for the original tax return. A taxpayer may only file the
election later than this six-month timeframe if the taxpayer requests and
obtains a private letter ruling as described in section 301.9100-3. Requesting a
private letter ruling is an expensive exercise. See supra note 84. In addition, a
private letter ruling will only be granted in limited circumstances. See supra
note 85 and accompanying text.
113. I.R.C. § 362(e)(2)(C)(ii).
114. See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 30–31; Yin, supra note 13, at 130.
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amount of tax liability.115 In some cases, the taxpayer will not
know with certainty whether an election will minimize tax
liability because some elections are forward looking. For
instance, as discussed previously,116 the benefits of making an
entity classification election or an election under
§ 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code depend on future
circumstances. Thus, taxpayers will not always be able to
achieve favorable tax outcomes because they may
inaccurately forecast future events. Nevertheless, because
some taxpayers will make elections wisely and will accurately
predict relevant future occurrences, even forward-looking
elections erode tax revenue.
Second,
tax
elections
produce
unfairness.117
Sophisticated, well-advised taxpayers will be best positioned
to take advantage of available elections given that they are
more likely to be aware of elections and their consequences.118
This bias against unsophisticated taxpayers is problematic
because it contributes to increasing wealth inequality and
interferes with the progressivity of the tax system.
Furthermore, unfairness can perpetuate the perception that
the tax system is unfair which can, in turn, undermine
115. See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 30–31; Yin, supra note 13, at 130.
116. See supra Parts I.D and I.E.
117. See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 31–32; Yin, supra note 13, at 130, 136;
Yorio, supra note 13, at 467. The term “fairness” is used here to refer to vertical
equity, which is the idea that people with a greater ability to pay taxes should
pay more. Tax rules that disadvantage unsophisticated taxpayers violate
vertical equity because, at least assuming tax sophistication and wealth are
correlated, such rules impose higher tax burdens on less wealthy taxpayers. A
tax election can also produce unfairness by granting more favorable tax
treatment to persons eligible for the election than persons ineligible for the
election. This type of unfairness is likely best addressed by either re-examining
the eligibility requirements for a given election or replacing an election with
mandatory treatment.
118. See, e.g., Field, supra note 10, at 32; Yin, supra note 13, at 130, 136. For
purposes of the proposal made by this Article, precise definitions of
sophisticated and unsophisticated are unnecessary because the proposals made
in this Article do not depend on whether or not a particular taxpayer is
sophisticated. For purposes of understanding the discussion in this Article, the
following, imprecise definitions of sophisticated and unsophisticated should
suffice: sophisticated taxpayers have sufficient knowledge of tax law or are
sufficiently well-advised to evaluate the pros and cons of making tax elections,
and unsophisticated taxpayers lack such knowledge and advice. Assuming that
sophistication, in this sense, tends to increase as a taxpayer’s wealth increases,
rules that are biased against unsophisticated taxpayers are problematic from a
fairness perspective.
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voluntary tax compliance.119
The bias against unsophisticated taxpayers may be
particularly pronounced in the case of elections that are due
prior to the date for filing a tax return. If an election is due
at the same time as a return, an unsophisticated taxpayer
may seek advice in connection with return preparation (or
may find guidance provided on a return form). In the context
of receiving this advice, the taxpayer could acquire
information about the available election.120 By contrast, if the
election is due before a tax return, an unsophisticated
taxpayer who is unaware of the election may see no reason to
ask for advice and, thus, will remain uninformed. Moreover,
if such a taxpayer later learns of the election, any attempt to
obtain relief to file a late election will likely fail because
taxpayers who do not seek advice before the filing deadline
are generally not allowed to file late elections.121 Conversely,
relief likely would be granted to a taxpayer who sought advice
prior to the time for filing an election, always intended to
make a favorable election, and merely failed to file the proper
election because of a minor error. In other words, late filing
relief will often be available only to sophisticated taxpayers.
Third, tax elections generate complexity.122 In order to
evaluate whether to make an election, taxpayers must
understand the consequences of making the election as well
as what occurs if the election is not made. This task can be
particularly difficult for elections that affect future years.123
In addition, taxpayers must determine the proper procedure
for making the election.124 Finally, IRS examiners must be
aware of the consequences of the election and how it is
119. Field, supra note 10, at 32 (discussing this in the context of tax
elections). For discussions of this phenomenon in the context of tax planning
generally, see Michael S. Knoll, Tax Planning, Effective Marginal Tax Rates,
and the Structure of the Income Tax, 54 TAX L. REV. 555 (2001); Leandra
Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003); Schizer, supra note 10, at 1319.
120. See Emily Cauble, Making Partnerships Work for Mom and Pop and
Everyone Else, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 247, 285 (2011).
121. See supra notes 80, 85 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02[1][c]; Field, supra note
10, at 27–30; Helvey & Stetson, supra note 13, at 335; Levin, supra note 13, at
1588; Yin, supra note 13, at 130; Yorio, supra note 13, at 463–64.
123. Field, supra note 10, at 27–28; Yorio, supra note 13, at 463–64.
124. Field, supra note 10, at 28; Yorio, supra note 13, at 464.
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made.125
III. WHY TAX ELECTIONS CONTINUE TO EXIST
As described above in Part II, tax elections are
problematic for several reasons. Yet, hundreds of elections
continue to inhabit tax law. This part briefly discusses why
elections are so prevalent despite their many flaws.
In some cases, tax elections can only be explained by the
political influence of those who benefit from them.126
Nevertheless, scholars have also identified benign
justifications for other elections. Two explanations127 are
offered most often.
The first explanation is that some elections provide an
This
option for taxpayers who want simplicity.128
explanation, at least in part, justifies giving taxpayers the
option to take the standard deduction rather than itemize
The standard deduction is simpler than
deductions.129
itemizing deductions because taxpayers can avoid the
inconvenience of calculating and maintaining evidence of
their actual expenses.130 Likewise, allowing divorced parents
125. Field, supra note 10 at 29–30.
126. This may be true in the case of certain elections in the partnership tax
context. For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 120.
127. A number of other explanations have also been suggested. See, e.g.,
LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02[1]; Field, supra note 10.
128. See, e.g., LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02[1]; Field, supra note 10,
at 53–54.
129. See, e.g., John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction
and the Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L.
203, 205 (2011); Field, supra note 10, at 53–54; Louis Kaplow, The Standard
Deduction and Floors in the Income Tax, 50 TAX L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1994); Theodore
P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of
Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1088–89 (2006). The availability of the
standard deduction has also been explained as a means of providing taxpayers
with a minimum amount of untaxed income. See, e.g., Brooks, supra, at 205;
Seto & Buhai, supra, at 1088–89.
130. This justification may adequately explain some elections, such as the
option to take the standard deduction and the treatment of the dependency
exemption. However, this explanation is also often given as the justification for
elections that, in reality, do not provide a simple option to taxpayers. For
example, the simplification rationale is typically given to explain why taxpayers
are allowed to elect among various partnership tax allocation methods under
§ 704(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. Yet, simplification does not adequately
explain that election. While taking the standard deduction truly is simpler
than itemizing deductions, in the context of § 704(c), all available methods are
complex. For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 120.
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to electively decide which parent claims a child as a
dependent can be a simplifying measure if the alternative
would involve requiring parents to keep records of the
relative amount of support each parent provides.131
Regarding the second explanation, scholars have
observed that, in some cases, if an election were eliminated
taxpayers would still choose their tax treatment.132 However,
rather than explicitly electing their desired tax treatment,
taxpayers would obtain the same treatment by changing
nontax features of their transactions.133 Scholars frequently
offer this explanation as a rationale for the rules regarding
entity classification.134 Prior to the adoption of the check-thebox regulations, businesses were classified as pass-through
entities or corporations based on a multifactor test under the
Kintner regulations.135 Under these regulations, an entity
that had more corporate features than noncorporate features
would be classified as a corporation.136 The key corporate
features were: (1) continuity of life, (2) centralization of
management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free transferability
of interests.137 Because some of these factors were arguably
easy to manipulate, scholars have observed that taxpayers
would obtain their desired classification by setting up an
entity with the right number of corporate or noncorporate
features.138
This type of tax planning raises all the concerns
surrounding explicit elections. In particular, this type of
planning will reduce tax revenue, produce unfairness (given
131. LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02[1][a].
132. See, e.g., LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02; Field, Checking in on
“Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464–68, 497 (explaining this rationale in
connection with the check-the-box regulations); Field, supra note 10, at 32–33.
133. See, e.g., LANG & KHOURY, supra note 80, ¶ 1.02; Field, Checking in on
“Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464–68, 497 (explaining this rationale in
connection with the check-the-box regulations); Field, supra note 10, at 32–33.
134. See, e.g., Philip A. Curry, Claire Hill, & Francesco Parisi, Creating
Failures in the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943, 961–62 (2007);
Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464–68, 497; Schizer,
supra note 10, at 1319–20, 1320 n.17; David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,
Doctrine, and Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1628–30 (1999).
135. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2)(3) (1960).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
138. See, e.g., Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 464;
Weisbach, supra note 134, at 1628–30, 1629 n.9.
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that well-advised taxpayers will be best positioned to
effectively tax plan), and contribute to the complexity of the
Furthermore, because taxpayers change
tax system.139
nontax features of their transactions, this type of tax
planning, unlike explicit tax elections, distorts taxpayers’
decision making, which can cause inefficiency if taxpayers
forgo transactions that would be preferable for nontax
reasons.140 Of course, whether or not this rationale justifies
any tax election depends on what baseline is used for
comparison. For example, this rationale may justify the
check-the-box regulations if the only alternative is the state of
the law as it existed prior to the adoption of those regulations.
Under those prior rules, some taxpayers could and did make
nontax changes in order to obtain more favorable tax
treatment.141 However, this rationale offers a less convincing
justification for the check-the-box regulations if one considers
a wider range of alternative rules. One such alternative
would involve mandatory classification of entities based on
nontax features that taxpayers are less likely to
manipulate.142 Another alternative would involve reducing or
139. For a discussion of these problems in connection with the tax planning
that occurred under the Kintner Regulations, see Field, Checking in on “Checkthe-Box,” supra note 13, at 464–69. For discussions of these problems in
connection with tax planning generally, see Cauble, supra note 10; Field, supra
note 10; Schizer, supra note 10.
140. For example, prior to the adoption of the check-the-box regulations, a
taxpayer might have formed an entity with characteristics that differed from
what would have been desirable from a non-tax standpoint. Of course, even
under current law, this still might be true because certain organizations are
automatically treated as corporations for tax purposes. See supra note 64. For
additional discussions of inefficiency and tax planning generally, see Cauble,
supra note 10; Field supra note 10, at 22–23 (stating that scholars generally
conclude that tax planning is detrimental to societal welfare); Knoll, supra note
119, at 555; Schizer, supra note 10, at 1319; Weisbach, supra note 134, at 1632.
141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
142. For example, perhaps all publicly traded entities would be treated as
corporations while all non-publicly traded entities would receive pass-through
treatment. See, e.g., Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the
Future of Business Taxation: A Comment on Professor Berger’s Plan, 47 TAX L.
REV. 815, 824 (1992) (“I would argue that public verses private is both a simpler
and a more logical place to draw the line between flow-through and separate
entity taxation.”). Given the value of liquidity, taxpayers may be unlikely to
sacrifice public trading in order to obtain more favorable tax treatment. For
discussions of the value of liquidity, see Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay
the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 986,
1103–06 (1988); Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the Corporate Income
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eliminating the tax distinctions among various entity
classifications.143
IV. MITIGATING THE HARMS CAUSED BY TAX ELECTIONS
As described above in Part III, tax elections persist for
several reasons. Moreover, regardless of the reason for a
particular tax election’s endurance, it would be infeasible to
abolish all tax elections.
Given the inevitability of at least some tax elections, this
part of the Article examines how elections could be designed
to mitigate resulting harms. In particular, this part of the
Article discusses four features of elections: (1) default rules;
(2) alerting taxpayers to the presence of an election; (3) the
deadline for filing the election; and (4) persistence—the
length of time during which any given election will affect tax
All of these features could be better
consequences.144
designed to mitigate the bias against unsophisticated
taxpayers.
A. Default Rules
One feature to consider when designing any tax election
is the default rule, or the rule that applies if the taxpayer
fails to make an election by the relevant deadline. Taxpayerfavorable default rules can mitigate the bias against
unsophisticated taxpayers.145 This is the case because, even
Tax, But to Save It, 56 TAX L. REV. 329, 343–47 (2003); Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason
& Roger H. Gordon, How Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?, 52 J. FIN.
477, 485 (1997); Jane G. Gravelle & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Incidence and
Efficiency Costs of Corporate Taxation When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms
Produce the Same Good, 97 J. POL. ECON. 749, 756–58 (1989).
143. See, e.g., Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 13, at 498
(“[T]o justify the CTB election as a simple and efficient approach to line-drawing
between business tax regimes applicable to virtually indistinguishable forms of
business, the existence of each separate business tax regime must be
defended.”). Of course, unifying the different business tax regimes is likely an
unrealistic goal.
144. Other features should be considered as well. For example, reducing the
level of formality that is required to opt out of default treatment could benefit
unsophisticated taxpayers, especially when the default rule is not a tailored
default rule; in other words, when the default rule is not taxpayer-favorable in
all cases. For a discussion of allowing taxpayers to make effective elections
when their intention is clear even if they have failed to comply with all formal
requirements, see Levin supra note 13.
145. See Field, supra note 10, at 67. A similar argument has been made
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when such taxpayers fail to file an election before its
deadline, they will receive favorable tax treatment by
default.146 At the same time, selecting a favorable default
rule will cause greater tax revenue erosion because less tax
will be collected from unsophisticated taxpayers who might
have failed to file an election even if the default rule was
unfavorable.
Nevertheless, fairness concerns should
outweigh tax revenue concerns given that the additional tax
revenue is lost primarily as a result of trapping fewer unwary
taxpayers and lost tax revenue can be recouped in fairer
ways.147 If losing the additional tax revenue is untenable,
serious consideration should be given to eliminating an
election entirely and mandating the less favorable treatment
for everyone rather than continuing to impose the less
favorable treatment on only the ill-informed. Moreover,
regarding complexity, favorable default rules can reduce
administrative burdens by diminishing the sheer number of
elections that are filed.148
The argument for selecting favorable default rules set
forth above is fairly straightforward. However, for two
reasons, the actual design of default rules becomes somewhat
more complicated. First, it is not always easy to select a
favorable default rule.
Second, extensive contract law
literature discusses default rules and the possible
information-forcing virtues of using unfavorable default rules
or penalty default rules.149 Thus, no consideration of default
rules would be complete without evaluating existing contract
law literature and assessing whether penalty default rules
regarding default rules applicable in the context of inheritance law. See Adam
J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1051–52 (2004).
146. See Field, supra note 10, at 68.
147. In order for the reforms proposed in this Article to promote fairness,
foregone tax revenue would have to be recouped in fairer ways, and the analysis
in this Article assumes that it will be. If this assumption does not hold true, the
proposed reforms will not necessarily promote fairness. For similar discussion,
see David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 240
(2002) (“A common claim is that tax shelters reduce the progressivity of the tax
system, because they are available only to the rich. . . . Contrary to this
intuition, however, there is no reason to think that reducing shelters directly
increases progressivity. If tax shelters were reduced, the extra revenue could be
used to reduce other taxes on the rich.”).
148. See Field, supra note 10, at 67.
149. Id. at 66–67.
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could be beneficial. This part of the Article evaluates these
points. In order to do so, first, Part 1 discusses the existing
contract law scholarship.
Second, Part 2 makes some
observations about features that distinguish tax law from
contract law which will be significant when designing default
rules for tax law. Finally, Part 3 discusses the design of
default rules for tax elections in detail.
1. Overview of Contract Law Scholarship Regarding
Default Rules
Default rules play an important role in contract law.
Contracting parties typically will not specify every possible
term that might govern their relationship. Thus, a court may
find it necessary to determine a contractual term in light of
the parties’ silence. When deciding what term to supply, the
court will rely on relevant default rules.150
Contract law scholars have observed that, at least in
some cases, the default rule should approximate the term to
which the parties would have agreed if they had considered
the matter and specifically settled on a term.151 One virtue of
such a default rule is that it can reduce the costs of
contracting.152 If the law will supply the term to which they
would have agreed, parties can remain silent on a given term
and, thus, save the time and energy they would have
otherwise spent anticipating and planning for every future
contingency and drafting the requisite contractual language.
In addition, as Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner
discuss, a default rule that corresponds to the term to which
the parties would have agreed could be either a tailored
default rule or an untailored default rule.153 A tailored
default rule aims to exactly match what the particular
contracting parties would have wanted, while an untailored
default rule might not match what any particular set of
contracting parties would have selected but rather represents

150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filing Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89–90 (1989)
(describing and citing to scholarship that argues for default rules that mimic
what contracting parties would have wanted).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 91.
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what the majority of contracting parties would desire.154 In
contract law, a tailored default rule is typically a vague,
flexible standard under which courts supply a term that
would be reasonable given the surrounding facts and
circumstances.155 Examples include: the default rule for price
provided by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
which states that, if parties intend to be bound by a contract
but fail to specify a price, the price will be a reasonable price
at the time for delivery;156 the rule providing that the
quantity of goods supplied under an output or requirements
contract cannot be unreasonably disproportionate to any
stated estimate or, in the absence of a stated estimate, to any
normal or otherwise comparable prior quantity;157 and rules
governing the time for shipment or delivery of goods.158
By contrast, an untailored default rule is usually a more
certain rule that represents what the majority of parties
prefer but that, given its inflexible nature, does not
necessarily represent what any particular set of contracting
parties might have chosen.159 Examples of untailored default
rules may include rules under Article 2 of the UCC that
govern the place for delivery of goods if none is specified
(generally the seller’s place of business)160 or the time for
making payment if not otherwise agreed (usually the time at
which the buyer is to receive the goods).161
The main virtue of tailored default rules is that they can
more closely correspond to what the particular contracting
parties would have selected. The chief drawback of tailored
default rules is that, because they are vague, courts may have
to incur more costs to apply them, and they lead to more
uncertainty regarding what term will be supplied.162 When
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1968); see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 95
(discussing this example).
157. U.C.C. § 2-306(1); see also, Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 92 n.27
(discussing this example).
158. U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (providing a reasonable time as the default rule).
159. See supra text accompanying note 154.
160. U.C.C. § 2-308(a) (providing that the default rule is different in some
circumstances); U.C.C. § 2-308(b), (c).
161. U.C.C. § 2-310(a) (providing that a different default rule is provided in
some cases); U.C.C. § 2-310(b), (c).
162. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51
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administering a tailored default rule, a court must consider
evidence of surrounding facts and circumstances to determine
what term is reasonable. By contrast, when implementing an
untailored default rule, the court simply consults the relevant
legal rule to find a precise term. In addition, given its vague
nature, a tailored default rule may be incorrectly applied by a
court, and, as a result, the court might supply a term that is
not, in fact, the term to which the parties would have agreed.
While there are certain advantages to default rules that
approximate the terms to which the parties would have
agreed, contract law scholars have also noted that, in certain
circumstances, it would be favorable to use penalty default
rules (or default rules that do not mimic what at least one
contracting party would have wanted). As Professors Ayres
and Gertner have discussed, setting the default rule to what
at least one contracting party would not have wanted induces
that party to contract out of the default rule, and, in the
process, that party may provide valuable information.163
Penalty default rules could encourage a contracting party
to provide useful information in at least three ways. First, if
the contracting parties leave a term open, courts must incur
If the
publicly-subsidized costs to supply a term.164
contracting parties, instead, specify a term, these publiclyfunded costs are avoided.165 For this reason, Professors Ayres
and Gertner suggest that, at least when it would be especially
costly for courts to fathom the term that the parties would
have selected, a penalty default rule that encourages the
parties to specify a term may be helpful.166 As an example,
Professors Ayres and Gertner contrast the price term in a
contract for sale of goods with the quantity term.167 If price is
STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1596 (1999) (“[D]efault provisions that are standards will
often be more expensive to implement than default provisions that are rules.
Courts, for example, in filling a price gap currently need to expend judicial
resources to determine what the ‘reasonable’ price would have been.” (citation
omitted)).
163. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93–94.
164. Id. at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1606.
165. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 162, at 1606.
166. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 162, at 1606.
167. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 162, at 1606.
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left open, courts, by relying on the market price, have a fairly
easy way of determining the price to which the parties would
have agreed.168 Thus, the default rule for open price terms is
a reasonable price and this corresponds to the term to which
parties would have agreed. By contrast, if the parties leave
the quantity term entirely open, courts will not have access to
readily available clues that provide a clear indication of the
quantity to which the parties would have agreed.169 Thus, the
courts will not enforce the contract, or, as Professors Ayres
and Gertner describe it, the default rule for quantity is
zero.170 A zero-quantity default rule is a penalty default rule
given that no parties would bother entering into an
agreement to sell nothing. In other words, while there is no
way of knowing what quantity the parties would have
specified, it is clear that it would have been a number other
than zero.171 It may be advisable for courts to use the zeroquantity penalty default rule because doing so encourages
parties to specify the quantity term themselves rather than
imposing the cost of uncovering the appropriate quantity
term on publicly-subsidized courts.172 Finally, in addition to
courts incurring high costs to investigate the matter, error
rates would likely be high because courts would often arrive
at a quantity term that was not the term to which the parties
would have agreed.
Second, a penalty default rule might encourage one
contracting party to provide useful information to another
contracting party allowing that other party to undertake
contractual duties in an appropriate manner.173 As an
example of this phenomenon, Professors Ayres and Gertner
and many others discuss the rule regarding consequential
Hadley
damages set forth in Hadley v. Baxendale.174
establishes the rule that a court will only award
168. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 162 at 1606.
169. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 162, at 1606.
170. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 162, at 1606.
171. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 97.
172. Id. at 93, 95–97; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1606.
173. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 94, 101–04.
174. Id.
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consequential damages if those damages are foreseeable.175
This rule can encourage one contracting party to provide the
other contracting party with information about the damages
he or she would suffer if the other party breaches.176 By doing
so, each contracting party will have put his or her
counterparty on notice about potential consequential
damages so that those damages will be foreseeable and, thus,
can be awarded if the contract is breached.
Finally,
encouraging provision of this information may be desirable
because, with this information, each party can properly
calibrate their behavior so as to take the appropriate level of
caution for avoiding breach.177
Third, penalty default rules could encourage one
contracting party to provide a particular type of information
to the other contracting party—namely, information about
the law itself.178 As Professors Ayres and Gertner observed,
in some contractual relationships, the parties are likely to
have different information about the relevant legal rules.179
For example, in the employment setting, the employer may
have more information about employment law than the
employee given that the employer enters into more
employment contracts than the employee.180 Employment
arrangements can be at-will, meaning the employer may
dismiss the employee for any reason (other than a reason
specifically disallowed by antidiscrimination laws, for
example) or no reason at all.181 Under current law, at-will is
the default rule so it governs unless the parties contractually
agree to a different standard, such as a standard under which
an employee can be dismissed only for cause.182 Compared to
the current at-will default rule, a for cause default rule (or a
default rule set to what most employers arguably would not

175. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ct.).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1603, 1606; Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal
Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 759–61 (1992).
179. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1603, 1606; Ayers & Gertner, supra
note 178, at 729, 759–61.
180. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 162, at 1603, 1606.
181. See id. at 1603.
182. See id.
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want) might more effectively induce information sharing. If
employers had to specifically contract with employees to
obtain an at-will standard, in the process, employees could
become more informed about the rule that applied to their
employment arrangement.183 By contrast, under the current
rules where the default rule arguably favors employers,
employers do not have an incentive to reveal to employees
information about the at-will status of their employment
relationship. The employment relationship will be at-will if
the contract is silent about the matter, and, as a result,
employers can benefit from at will arrangements without
educating the employees about the terms of their
employment. Employees might, incorrectly, assume they can
be fired only for cause and, as a result, they might demand
lower pay, for example, than what they would require if they
knew they could be fired without cause.
As described above, penalty default rules conceivably
encourage contracting parties to provide information to each
other or to a third party such as a court. Although penalty
default rules potentially provide these informational benefits,
penalty default rules may also be hazardous because, for a
variety of reasons, parties will not always opt out of a default
rule even if another term would be preferable. The reasons
why parties might be stuck with default rules, even if they
are unfavorable, fall under two broad headings. First, some
explanations fall under the heading of transaction costs.184
For example, as a result of the cost of obtaining information
about applicable legal rules, parties may not learn what the
183. Id. at 1603, 1606.
184. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99
YALE L.J. 611 (1989). Transaction costs could take many forms in addition to
the information costs mentioned above in the text. In addition to information
costs, transaction costs include get-together costs (the costs of getting the
contracting parties together to negotiate for terms other than default terms),
and decision and execution costs (costs of deciding on contractual terms and
drafting relevant contractual language). See, e.g., id. at 615–16. Furthermore,
parties might fail to contract away from a default rule if one contracting party
strategically withholds information from the other party to avoid loss of
bargaining power. For example, a contracting party with high consequential
damages might withhold that information from a counterparty to avoid paying a
much higher rate. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
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default rule is and may, incorrectly, assume that it is
favorable. If so, they might fail to opt out of the default rule.
Similarly, as a result of the costs of obtaining information,
parties might fail to consider a future contingency that makes
a default rule relevant and, as a result, they might not opt out
of the default rule. Second, some explanations for why
parties would be stuck with an unfavorable default rule fall
under the heading of behavioral reasons. In particular,
various studies show that people may fail to opt out of default
rules because people behave as if they prefer a rule simply
because it is the default rule.185
2. Why Tax Law is Special
In the tax election context, taxpayer-favorable default
rules are beneficial in several ways. In particular, they allow
taxpayers to avoid the costs of filing elections, they allow the
IRS to avoid the costs of processing elections, and they
mitigate the bias against unsophisticated taxpayers.186
Moreover, although, in contract law, penalty default rules
might serve the valuable purpose of encouraging contracting
parties to provide information to each other or third parties
(like courts), various features that distinguish tax law from
contract law make penalty default rules less valuable in the
context of tax law. Ultimately, the relevant differences
between tax law and contract law relate to important timing
differences between making tax elections, on the one hand,
and selecting contract provisions, on the other hand. This
section discusses the relevant differences and how they affect
the analysis.
i.

In the Tax Law Context, Mechanisms Other than
Penalty Default Rules can be Used to Ensure
that Taxpayers Have Relevant Information

In tax law, the government becomes involved at an
earlier stage and, thus, readily available mechanisms other
than penalty default rules can ensure that each affected
185. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein,
Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002).
186. See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text.
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taxpayer is adequately informed, at least in the case of
elections that are not due until a tax return is filed.187
Furthermore, unlike penalty default rules, these mechanisms
are not detrimental to unsophisticated taxpayers.
To demonstrate, in contract law, one contracting party
may possess more information about legal rules than the
other contracting party. In such situations, selecting a
default rule that is disadvantageous for the more informed
party could encourage that party to affirmatively contract out
of the default rule, and, in the process, provide information to
the less informed party.188 In contract law, scholars provide
the example of selecting a default rule under which
employees could be fired only for cause, as discussed above.189
In the context of the tax election regarding alimony,
Professor Field has described a similar potential use of
penalty default rules.190 As Professor Field observes, at least
assuming that more wealthy individuals are more
sophisticated about tax law, often the payor of alimony may
be more knowledgeable about tax law than the recipient.191 A
penalty default rule (in particular, a rule that alimony is not
deductible by the payor and is not includible in the income of
the recipient) combined with an available election under
which both parties could agree to the opposite treatment
(alimony is deductible and includible in income) could
encourage the spouse paying alimony to inform the recipient
about the default rule and the election.192 Once the recipient
is aware of the tax rules, the recipient would be more
equipped to demand higher alimony payments in exchange
for agreeing to allow the payor to deduct alimony.193
As Professor Field acknowledges, there exists, however, a
potential flaw with the approach of adopting such a penalty

187. In some cases, tax elections are due before tax returns must be filed and,
in these cases, this alternative solution might not be feasible. However, as
discussed below, it may be advisable to eliminate or at least reduce the number
of such elections. See infra Part IV.C.
188. See supra notes 178–183 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 178–183 and accompanying text.
190. See Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13, at 52–54.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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default rule for alimony.194 In particular, while this penalty
default rule may operate well in cases in which one spouse is
sophisticated
and
informed,
this
default
rule
disproportionately harms couples in which both spouses are
unsophisticated and ill-informed.195 Such couples may be
more likely to fail to opt out of the default treatment and, if
so, they will incur higher aggregate tax liability (assuming
the payor is in a higher tax bracket than the recipient). For
this reason, a penalty default rule may be ill-advised,
especially given that other means could be used to ensure
that the spouse receiving alimony is informed of the relevant
rules, as discussed below.
Regarding these other means of informing a party, in
contract law, at the time parties are establishing the terms of
the contract, courts and other third parties are not involved.
Therefore, relying on one contracting party to inform the
other party of applicable legal rules may be the only available
option. By contrast, in tax law, the government, in the
capacity of providing information on tax return forms, is
involved at the time the parties make tax election decisions,
at least for elections that are filed at the same time as tax
returns. Thus, rather than rely on other taxpayers as the
source of information about the law, the IRS could directly
provide information to less informed taxpayers through tax
forms. For example, in the context of alimony, the default
194. Id. “Of course, a default rule that favors a less-informed party does not
guarantee that the taxpayer will be able to bargain effectively or that the
taxpayers, as a unit, will reach the agreement that best minimizes their
aggregate tax burden.
Taxpayers may make uneducated or ill-advised
decisions.” Id. at 54.
195. Given that alimony is generally only awarded when one party has
significant wealth, the likelihood of encountering two unsophisticated taxpayers
in the alimony context may not be particularly high. Nonetheless, in some
cases, the parties may fail to consider tax consequences. Furthermore, the fact
that divorcing parties may seek legal representation during their divorce can
reduce the likelihood of encountering unsophisticated parties in the divorce
context because the parties may be advised by their lawyers. However, not all
divorce lawyers will be aware of the relevant tax rules. Id. at 24 (“Not all
divorce lawyers are sophisticated tax planners . . . .”). In addition, not all
divorcing parties will have legal representation. Id. at 24 n.92 (mentioning that
divorcing parties are increasingly representing themselves and observing that,
although “divorcing spouses are more likely to retain lawyers in the situations
where the dependency allocation election and/or the alimony election may be
available . . . a significant number of divorcing spouses . . . proceeded pro se”).
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rule could provide (and does provide) that alimony is
deductible and includible in income.
Furthermore, the
recipient could be given the right to elect unilaterally to
exclude the payment from income as long as he or she informs
the payor so that the payor cannot take a deduction, and as
long as the parties have not explicitly agreed otherwise.
Finally, information specifically provided on a tax return
could inform the recipient of the relevant legal rules and the
availability of the election, and electronic tax return
preparation can alleviate any additional complexity
associated with providing more information to taxpayers, as
discussed in Part IV.B. below. Once the recipient was
informed of the relevant rules, he or she would be able to
demand higher alimony payments from the payor in exchange
for agreeing to not exercise the option to exclude the payment
from income.
ii. It is Often Easier to Determine what Taxpayers
would have Wanted Than it is to Determine
what Contracting Parties would have
Wanted
Timing distinguishes tax law and contract law because,
while many tax elections are backward looking, contract
provisions are always forward looking.196 Because of this
difference, at least in the case of elections that are backward
looking, the IRS can easily determine what election taxpayers
would have made. In contract law, penalty default rules can
For
encourage contracting parties to specify terms.197
example, as discussed above, the zero-quantity default rule
induces contracting parties to specify the quantity of goods
they intend to sell because, if they fail to designate a
quantity, the court will supply zero as the quantity term.198
By encouraging contracting parties to indicate a quantity,
courts avoid the high costs of trying to divine what quantity
the parties desired and steer clear of the risk of determining a
quantity that differs from what the parties intended.199

196.
197.
198.
199.

See infra Part IV.A.2.ii for further discussion.
See supra notes 164–172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 164–172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 164–172 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to contract law, in tax law, it is less necessary
for the parties to affirmatively make a tax election because,
without much effort, the IRS can decide what tax election the
parties would have wanted in the case of backward-looking
elections. Because tax elections affect tax outcomes only,
taxpayers would want whatever election minimizes the
aggregate tax liability of the affected taxpayers. Thus, unlike
contract terms with respect to which individuals have varied
preferences, tax election preferences are rather predictable.
Further, many tax elections are backward looking. In other
words, in many cases, at the time an election is due,
taxpayers will have access to all information necessary to
conclude whether a given election minimizes tax liability. For
backward-looking elections, in order for the IRS to determine
what election taxpayers would have made, the IRS only needs
to examine the information that was available to taxpayers as
of the due date for the election and mathematically calculate
what election would have minimized tax liability.200 At least
if taxpayers provide the relevant information, the IRS can
make the determination fairly cheaply and with very low risk
of failing to select what the taxpayers would have wanted.
Moreover, if the IRS incurs additional administrative costs in
order to request necessary information from taxpayers, the
IRS could impose a monetary penalty on taxpayers to cover
this cost rather than penalize taxpayers by depriving them of
the benefits of a favorable election.201
200. Furthermore, particularly as electronic filing of tax returns becomes
more and more common, the administrative costs of making this determination
will decrease.
201. Other scholars have observed that penalties short of loss of favorable tax
elections can encourage taxpayers to file returns and provide information. See,
e.g., Levin, supra note 13, at 1606; Charles S. Lyon, Tax Blunders: Treasury
Should Reduce Their Cost, 45 TAXES 575, 594 (1967) (suggesting that late filing
of elections could be penalized with a “smaller financial price” than “complete
forfeiture of favorable tax treatment”); Yorio, supra note 13, at 479. A similar
argument has been made regarding court costs in the context of contract law.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 571 (2006) (“[T]he obvious remedy . . . is to charge
parties a fee for using the court system.”). In the contract law context, while
this solution ensures that the contracting parties bear court costs, it does not
address the problems stemming from the fact that courts, inevitably, will make
errors and supply terms the differ from what the parties would have wanted.
By contrast, in the context of some tax elections, it will often be easy to
determine what the parties would have wanted so errors will be less likely.
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iii. Tailored Default Rules Are Often Easier to
Administer in the Tax Context than the
Contract Context
Also because of the backward-looking nature of many tax
elections, tailored default rules in tax law, unlike contract
law, often need not be vague, ill-defined standards. A tailored
default rule aims to exactly match what the particular parties
would have wanted, while an untailored default rule might
not match what any particular set of parties would have
selected but rather represents what the majority of parties
would desire.202 In contract law, a tailored default rule is
typically a vague, flexible standard under which courts
supply a term that would be reasonable given the
surrounding facts and circumstances.203 As a result of their
vague nature, tailored default rules in contract law are costly
to apply because courts must consider available evidence to
determine what term is reasonable.204 In addition, there is a
significant risk that a court will select a term that is not, in
fact, the term to which the parties would have agreed.
By contrast, in tax law, tailored default rules could often
be easy to apply because tailored default rules can be clearly
defined. For example, in the context of alimony, the current
rule is an untailored default rule.205 Under current law, by
default, alimony is deductible by the payor and is included in
the recipient’s income.206 This rule is favorable for the
majority of taxpayers because, in most cases, the payor is in a
higher tax bracket than the recipient. However, it is not
necessarily favorable for any particular divorced couple
because, in the case of any particular couple, the recipient
could be in a higher tax bracket than the payor.
A tailored default rule would be taxpayer-favorable in all
cases, not just in the majority of cases. In the context of
alimony, such a rule would provide that, unless the parties
elect otherwise: (i) in any year in which the payor is in a
higher marginal tax bracket than the recipient, alimony is
deductible and includible in income and (ii) in any year in
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra text accompanying notes 154–155.
See supra text accompanying notes 154–155.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
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which the recipient is in a higher tax bracket than the payor,
alimony is not deductible and not includible in income.207 At
least for the election regarding alimony (and other backwardlooking elections), a tailored default rule is not difficult to
apply. The IRS or the court would only need to know the
income information for the payor and recipient for the
relevant year (information which should already be included
on the individuals’ tax returns). With this information, the
IRS can apply the tailored default rule to determine precisely
what the taxpayers would have wanted.
In cases in which it is difficult to design an untailored
default rule, tailored default rules may be particularly useful.
For example, as discussed above, it is unclear whether the
majority of divorced couples would benefit from the custodial
parent claiming a child as a dependent or from the
noncustodial parent doing so. This is unclear because it is not
obvious whether, in the majority of divorced couples, the
custodial parent is in a higher or lower tax bracket than the
noncustodial parent. Furthermore, even if this matter is
settled empirically, it very well could be the case that the
majority is not much larger than fifty percent. In other
words, instead of, for example, finding that, in ninety percent
of couples, the noncustodial parent is in a higher tax bracket
than the custodial parent, one might discover that this is true
for only sixty percent of couples.
Thus, although an
untailored default rule (providing for the noncustodial parent
to take the exemption) would minimize tax liability most of
the time (in particular, in sixty percent of cases), such a
default rule would fail to minimize tax liability quite often (in
particular, in forty percent of cases). For this reason, a
tailored default rule may be preferable. A tailored default
rule would provide that, by default, whichever parent was in
a higher marginal tax bracket would take the exemption.208
Although applying a tailored default rule to backwardlooking elections is fairly simple, applying a tailored default
rule to forward-looking elections could be quite costly and
difficult.209 The task of administering a tailored default rule
for a forward-looking election more closely resembles the task
207. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.3.iii.
208. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.3.iii.
209. For further discussion, see infra Parts IV.A.3.ii, IV.A.3.iv.
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of administering a tailored default rule in contract law
because all contract provisions are forward looking. When a
court employs a tailored default rule in contract law, the
court must determine the term to which the parties would
have agreed at the time the parties entered into the
contract.210 Because the contract term governs the parties’
relationship going forward, the parties would have designed a
contract term based on what they anticipated would occur
after entering into the contract. For instance, the quantity to
which the parties would have agreed in a contract for sale of
goods would depend on what the buyer and seller anticipated
regarding future business needs, future production capacity,
and future market prices. Thus, if a court must apply a
tailored default rule to determine what the parties would
have wanted, the court would be required to assess what the
parties would have anticipated as of the date the contract was
formed. The task of applying a tailored default rule to a
forward-looking tax election is similar. In this case, too, a
court or the IRS would need to discover what future events
would have been predicted by the taxpayers as of the
election’s due date and select whatever tax treatment would
have appeared favorable based on those predictions. For
these reasons, tailored default rules should be used for
backward-looking elections but likely should be avoided for
forward-looking elections.
3. Designing Tax Election Default Rules
The observations discussed above can be used to inform
how tax election default rules should be designed in
particular cases. As discussed below, unless the default rule
is insignificant because of an election’s other parameters,
tailored default rules generally should accompany backwardlooking elections, while untailored default rules should be
associated with forward-looking elections. Generally, penalty
default rules ought to be avoided.211

210. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
211. This is true for the elections discussed in this Article. It is also true in
most other cases, given that penalty default rules can disproportionately harm
unsophisticated taxpayers and given that penalty default rules are not
particularly useful in the tax context as discussed in Part IV.A.2.
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In addition to varying in terms of whether they are
backward-looking or forward-looking, tax elections vary with
regard to whether they affect taxpayers whose interests are
aligned or taxpayers whose interests diverge. If an election
affects taxpayers whose interests are aligned, the taxpayers
can readily agree on what election is made without one
taxpayer compensating another taxpayer for making a given
election. If an election affects taxpayers with divergent
interests, the identity of the taxpayer who has the right to
make the election can significantly affect how the taxpayers
share the election’s tax benefit which, in turn, has important
distributional consequences. Thus, when an election affects
taxpayers whose interests diverge, election parameters
should be designed with the goal of encouraging parties to
share the tax benefit in an equitable manner.
This part discusses proposed election default rules for
four categories of elections: (i) backward-looking elections
that affect taxpayers whose interests are aligned, (ii) forwardlooking elections that affect taxpayers whose interests are
aligned, (iii) backward-looking elections that affect taxpayers
with divergent interests, and (iv) forward-looking elections
that affect taxpayers with divergent interests. The proposed
default rules are intended to mitigate the bias against
unsophisticated taxpayers.
i.

Backward-Looking Elections that Affect
Taxpayers Whose Interests Are Aligned

An example of a backward-looking election that affects
taxpayers whose interests are aligned212 is the choice between
taking the standard deduction and itemizing deductions.
Generally, in the case of backward-looking elections, tailored
default rules may be advisable, as discussed above.213
However, the current default rule for this election, under
which the taxpayer is entitled to the standard deduction, is
necessary as a practical matter because the IRS will not be
able to calculate itemized deductions if the taxpayer
persistently fails to provide information about his or her
212. In some cases, the election affects only one taxpayer, while, in other
cases, particularly in the case of a married couple, the election affects multiple
taxpayers whose interests are aligned.
213. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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actual expenses.
Moreover, in the case of this particular election, because
taxpayers are given ample opportunity to make an election,214
the default rule is of limited importance and likely need not
be changed to further protect unsophisticated taxpayers.
Providing taxpayers with multiple opportunities to make an
election serves nearly the same function as a tailored default
rule. Like a tailored default rule, providing numerous
chances to make an election allows taxpayers to receive
favorable treatment even when they fail to file an election.
For instance, if a taxpayer fails to file a tax return (and, thus,
fails to elect between the standard deduction and itemizing
deductions), the IRS will likely file a substitute return using
the standard deduction.215 Once a substitute return is filed, a
taxpayer could file a corrected return.216 In this return, if it is
beneficial to do so, the taxpayer could itemize deductions, and
the taxpayer would not lose favorable tax treatment as a
result of a failure to initially make an election.217 Unlike a
tailored default rule, repeated opportunities to make an
election can only assist taxpayers who eventually take action.
Thus, if the taxpayer does not file a corrected return, he or
she will not be entitled to itemize deductions even if doing so
would be advantageous.218
Finally, as discussed above, in the tax context, devices
other than loss of favorable tax treatment can encourage
taxpayers to provide information.219 In the case of the
standard deduction, the law already takes this approach.220 A
taxpayer who fails to file a return does not automatically lose
the opportunity to make a favorable election because the
taxpayer can do so in a corrected return.221 Instead, the
taxpayer likely would be subject to a monetary penalty for
failure to file, and this penalty, rather than loss of the ability
to make an election, can induce timely filing.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
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ii. Forward-Looking Elections that Affect Taxpayers
Whose Interests Are Aligned
The entity classification election is a forward-looking
election that affects taxpayers whose interests are aligned.
Even if a business has more than one owner,222 the owners
can easily align their interests because each owner can hold
an interest in the business through a different entity.223
In order to mitigate the bias against unsophisticated
taxpayers, the default rule for entity classification should be
taxpayer favorable. However, a tailored default rule would be
costly to administer given that the election is forward looking.
In order to apply a tailored default rule, anytime a taxpayer
failed to file an entity classification election, the IRS would
need to assess what the taxpayer would have wanted based
on information available to the taxpayer as of the election’s
due date. What the taxpayer would have wanted depends on
the taxpayer’s expectations regarding future events, including
the future profitability of the underlying business. Thus, the
IRS would have to consider evidence bearing on the
taxpayer’s predictions for the future of the business as of the
due date for the election. Making this determination would
be costly and the risk of error would be high. Because of the
downsides of employing a tailored default rule, an untailored
default rule is preferable. Moreover, current law already
provides for an untailored default rule, at least for U.S.
entities given that, by default, U.S. entities receive passthrough treatment, which is favorable in most cases.224

222. If an entity has one owner, the election can affect two taxpayers—the
entity and the owner. However, given that the owner owns 100% of the entity,
the interests of the entity and the owner are aligned.
223. For example, if A, B, and, C own a business, they could form a
partnership to hold the business assets directly. The partnership could, in turn,
be owned by A, B, and, a corporation (100% of which was owned by C). This
ownership structure allows C to own the business through a corporation while
the other individuals own the business through pass-through entities.
Likewise, if C already owned a business that was treated as a corporation and A
and B wanted to join the business but preferred pass-through treatment, the
corporation owned by C could contribute its assets to a partnership that A and
B join. Because businesses can be easily arranged so that all owners obtain
their desired tax treatment, owners can easily resolve any disagreement over
how to treat the entity.
224. See supra Part I.D.
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Finally, because the default rule is untailored, some
taxpayers will benefit from opting out of default treatment.
For this reason, other features of the election should be
designed to increase the likelihood that unsophisticated
taxpayers will consider the election and make an informed
decision. For example, changing the due date for the election
to the due date for the entity’s first tax return is advisable. If
the election is due with a tax return, unsophisticated
taxpayers can obtain advice regarding the election in the
context of seeking assistance with tax return preparation,
and the IRS can alert taxpayers to the availability of the
election by providing specific information on tax return
forms.225
iii. Backward-Looking Elections that Affect
Taxpayers With Divergent Interests
Examples of backward-looking elections that affect
taxpayers with divergent interests include the election
regarding the tax treatment of alimony and the election by
divorced parents that determines which parent claims a child
as a dependent.226 In the context of these examples, tailored
default rules would further the aim of reducing bias against
unsophisticated taxpayers, which should be the dominant
consideration when selecting default rules, as discussed
above.227 In addition, because the tax elections are backward
looking, applying tailored default rules is not overly
burdensome.228 Furthermore, adopting tailored default rules
can alleviate the difficulty of designing an untailored default
rule in the case of the dependency exemption election.229
Implementing these recommendations would involve
changing the current parameters of these elections.
225. See infra Part IV.B. Some taxpayers will receive tax advice in
connection with seeking general legal advice before starting a business.
However, not all taxpayers will seek general legal advice, and not all legal
advisors will provide adequate tax counsel. It might be possible, however, to
provide tax information on formation documents, to at least assist businesses
that are formed as state law entities. Such information could alert taxpayers to
the existence of the entity classification election even earlier than the tax return
deadline.
226. See supra Part I.B.–C.
227. See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 205–08 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 205–208 and accompanying text.
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In the context of the alimony election, a tailored default
rule would provide that: (1) if the spouse paying alimony is in
a higher tax bracket than the spouse receiving alimony in any
given year,230 the payment is deductible by the payor and
included in income by the recipient, and (2) if the spouse
receiving alimony is in a higher tax bracket than the spouse
paying alimony in any given year,231 the payment is not
deductible by the payor and not included in income by the
recipient.232 If neither (1) nor (2) applies because the spouses
are in the same tax bracket,233 the default rule could provide
230. In particular, rule (1) applies if the payor’s marginal tax bracket based
on taxable income calculated after deducting alimony is higher than the
recipient’s marginal tax bracket based on taxable income calculated after
including alimony in income.
231. In particular, rule (2) applies if the payor’s marginal tax bracket based
on taxable income calculated without a deduction for alimony is lower than the
recipient’s marginal tax bracket based on taxable income calculated without
including alimony in income.
232. One might object to the proposal on the grounds that it makes it more
difficult to discern what the default rule is. For example, spouses would need to
share information about their taxable incomes in order to determine what the
default rule is. However, making a default rule more difficult to determine does
not necessarily complicate the law because taxpayers can still take action
without knowing the default rule. For example, for non-U.S. entities, the
applicable default classification depends on whether owners of the entity have
limited liability under applicable non-U.S. law. Some taxpayers will file a
protective classification election, because determining whether all owners have
limited liability could be difficult and involve obtaining an opinion from nonU.S. legal counsel. In other words, they will affirmatively elect their desired tax
treatment without knowing for certain that doing so is absolutely necessary (in
other words, without knowing for certain that the elected treatment is different
than default treatment). Similarly, in the alimony context, even without
knowing the default rule, taxpayers could proceed by either: (i) explicitly
agreeing that the paying spouse will deduct alimony and the receiving spouse
will include alimony in income, or (ii) affirmatively electing the alternative
treatment. The spouses would need to share taxable income information with
each other if they want to evaluate what election leads to the most favorable tax
treatment. However, even under current law, spouses need to share this
information in order to evaluate the pros and cons of making a given election.
233. The tie-breaking rule, in fact, could be slightly more complicated. In
particular, one could ask why rules (1) and (2) do not apply. This could arise for
different reasons. One possibility is that, no matter how alimony is treated, the
spouses will always be in the same tax bracket. For example, assume that,
prior to taking alimony into account, payor’s taxable income is $60,000 and
recipient’s taxable income is $40,000. Assume the amount of alimony is
$10,000. For 2012, an individual will be in the 25% marginal tax bracket if his
or her income is between $35,350 and $85,650. The payor’s taxable income falls
in this range with or without the deduction (it is $50,000 with the deduction and
$60,000 without the deduction). Likewise, the recipient’s taxable income falls in
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that the payor would not deduct the alimony and the
recipient would not include it in his or her income.234
Regarding opting out of the default rule, the spouse receiving
alimony could unilaterally decide to exclude alimony from
income in any given year by providing notice to the paying
spouse of this decision prior to the tax return due date for
that year and including a copy of this notice with the
recipient spouse’s tax return. The spouse receiving alimony
could make this election unless the divorce agreement or an
amendment to it applicable to a particular year explicitly
provided otherwise. If provided with such notice, the paying
spouse would not be allowed to deduct alimony, unless the
parties had explicitly agreed otherwise. As discussed below,
this range with or without including alimony in income (it is $50,000 if the
alimony is included and $40,000 if it is not). In this situation, the tie-breaking
rule described in the text would apply so that, by default, alimony is not
deductible and not includible in income. Another possibility is that the parties
begin in different tax brackets but the alimony payment is enough to move the
parties into the same tax bracket. For example, assume that, prior to taking
alimony into account, the payor’s taxable income is $90,000 and recipient’s
taxable income is $80,000. Assume the amount of alimony is $10,000. Again,
for 2012, an individual will be in the 25% marginal tax bracket if his or her
income is between $35,350 and $85,650, while an individual will be in the 28%
marginal tax bracket for income over $85,650 and up to $178,650. The payor’s
taxable income reaches the 28% marginal tax bracket without the deduction but
does not reach beyond the 25% marginal tax bracket with the deduction (it is
$80,000 with the deduction and $90,000 without the deduction). The recipient’s
taxable income reaches the 28% marginal tax bracket if alimony is included in
income but does not extend beyond the 25% marginal tax bracket if alimony is
excluded (it is $90,000 if the alimony is included and $80,000 if it is not). In
this case, the default rule could provide that a portion of the alimony is
deductible (and includible in income) and a portion of the alimony is not
deductible (and not includible in income). The portion that is deductible (and
includible in income) is the minimum amount necessary to make it so that the
payor’s marginal tax bracket, based on taxable income calculated after the
deduction of that portion, is the same as the recipient’s marginal tax bracket,
based on taxable income calculated after including that portion in income.
Thus, in the example above, the payor would deduct $4350 (bringing his or her
taxable income to $85,650 and thus within the 25% marginal tax bracket), and
the recipient would include this $4350 in income (bringing his or her taxable
income to $84,350, still within the 25% marginal tax bracket).
234. This choice is somewhat arbitrary. However, it is a logical choice if the
recipient is granted a unilateral right to exclude alimony from income. When
the spouses are in the same tax bracket, the recipient would likely exercise this
unilateral right given that the spouses’ aggregate tax liability would not be
reduced by allowing the paying spouse to deduct alimony. Because the recipient
would likely opt to exclude alimony from income, selecting this result as the
default rule can reduce administrative costs.
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tax return forms could provide information to ensure that
individuals were aware of the election.
The parameters described above accomplish two goals.
First, if both spouses are unsophisticated and, as a result,
they fail to consider the election and make an informed
choice, their aggregate tax liability will, nevertheless, be
minimized under the tailored default rule described above.235
In some cases, the payor might be sophisticated while the
recipient is unsophisticated. Moreover, in such a case, the
payor would receive favorable tax treatment by default if he
or she was in a higher tax bracket than the recipient because,
in that case, the payor would be entitled to deduct alimony by
default. Thus, it might seem that the payor would lack any
incentive to inform the recipient of his or her ability to make
a contrary election. Nevertheless, the mechanics of the
election described above do induce the payor to provide this
information. In particular, the spouse receiving alimony
could learn about the available election from tax return forms
and could opt out of the default treatment unilaterally
(making alimony not deductible and not includible in income).
Knowing this, the informed paying spouse would have an
incentive to obtain the receiving spouse’s explicit agreement
not to exercise this election, and the receiving spouse would
be positioned to demand greater alimony payments in
exchange for agreeing not to exercise the election.236 In this
235. As an example of how this would affect taxpayers, consider a couple in
which the spouse paying alimony (P) is in a lower tax bracket than the spouse
receiving alimony (R) in a given year. Assume the couple is unsophisticated and
fails to consider the tax treatment of alimony. Also, assume they have made no
designation regarding the tax treatment of alimony in their separation
agreement or any amendment to that agreement. The individuals file tax
returns. P deducts alimony, and R includes alimony in income. Given the
individuals’ tax brackets, this treatment results in higher aggregate tax liability
than the alternative (P not deducting alimony and R excluding alimony from
income). Under current law, the individuals would receive this less favorable
tax treatment because it is consistent with the default rule, and they have not
taken the necessary steps to opt out of the default rule. Under the proposed
rule, the individuals would have reported the wrong tax treatment. By default,
in this case, P should not deduct the payment and R should exclude it from
income. Furthermore, the individuals did not take the steps necessary to opt
out of the default rule. Therefore, they incorrectly reported their tax treatment.
Because the individuals reported the wrong tax treatment, they could later
amend their tax returns, or the IRS might correct the mistake.
236. This analysis assumes that non-tax law provides the parties with
sufficient flexibility to negotiate over alimony payments, which might not
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way, the recipient can share in some of the economic benefit
resulting from the payor’s ability to deduct alimony.
In the context of the dependency exemption election, a
tailored default rule would provide that whichever parent is
in a higher tax bracket237 in any given year will claim a child
as a dependent.238 As a result of this tailored default rule, if
both spouses fail to consider the election due to a lack of
sophistication, their aggregate tax liability, nevertheless, will
be minimized.239 Moreover, this tailored default rule will
result in favorable tax consequences more often than an
untailored default rule, as discussed above.240 If the parents
are in the same tax bracket in any given year, the default rule
could provide that the custodial parent will claim the child as
a dependent.241
Regarding opting out of the default rule, because there
may be policy reasons for ensuring that the custodial parent
receives some of the economic benefit of claiming the child as
a dependent,242 the custodial parent could have the unilateral
always be the case.
237. To take into account the possibility that the exemption could move one
or both of the spouses from a higher tax bracket to a lower tax bracket, the
default rule could be implemented in a way that is similar to the proposed
implementation for alimony discussed supra note 233. In addition, to be
taxpayer-favorable in all cases, the default rule would need to be more complex
because other factors can affect the analysis of which parent should claim the
child as a dependent. See supra note 60.
238. Such a default rule is not without precedent because a similar rule
already applies in some cases in which multiple taxpayers would be entitled to
claim a dependent. See I.R.C. §§ 152(c)(4)(A)(ii), 152(c)(4)(B)(ii) (2012). One
might object to the proposal on the grounds that it makes it more difficult to
discern what the default rule is. For a discussion of this concern, see supra note
232.
239. This is true as long as either: (1) the taxpayers file their returns
correctly (correctly meaning in a way that happens to coincide with the default
rule given that the taxpayers have not affirmatively opted out of the default
rule), or (2) the taxpayers file their returns incorrectly and either the IRS audits
and corrects the returns or the taxpayers eventually discover their error and
amend their returns. For further discussion, see supra note 235.
240. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
241. This choice is somewhat arbitrary. However, it is a logical choice if the
custodial parent is granted a unilateral right to claim the exemption for the
same reason that a similar choice is logical in the context of alimony. See supra
note 234. In addition, this rule helps to ensure that the custodial parent obtains
some of the economic benefit of the exemption which is a desirable goal. See
infra note 242 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, supra note 13, at 67
(“Allocation of the dependency exemption to the parent with custody of the
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right to claim the child as a dependent in any given year by
providing notice to the noncustodial parent of this decision
prior to the tax return due date for that year and including a
copy of this notice with the custodial parent’s tax return. The
custodial parent could make this election unless the couple
had explicitly agreed otherwise, and, absent such an explicit
agreement, the noncustodial parent would not be allowed to
claim the child as a dependent if provided with notice by the
custodial parent.243 Granting the custodial parent this right
would give the custodial parent leverage to demand payments
from the noncustodial parent in exchange for agreeing not to
exercise this right. Thus, if doing so would reduce aggregate
tax liability, the noncustodial parent could claim an
exemption and pay part of the economic benefit of the
deduction to the custodial parent.
Finally, to ensure that the custodial parent was aware of
the election and thereby in a position to negotiate with the
noncustodial parent, tax return forms could provide
taxpayers with information regarding this election.244
Providing information in this manner reduces the need to
identify the spouse who is likely to be more informed245 and
select a default rule that encourages the more informed
spouse to educate the other spouse.246
children directs the tax benefit to the household in which the children primarily
reside, thereby hopefully conferring a distributional benefit on these
households.”).
243. Also, if in any given case the default rule would provide that the
custodial parent is entitled to the exemption (because he or she is in a higher
tax bracket), then, in order to opt out of the default rule, both parents would
have to either: (i) specify in their divorce agreement that the noncustodial
parent will claim the exemption, or (ii) check a box on their individual returns
affirmatively stating that they have agreed that the noncustodial parent will
claim the exemption.
244. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
245. This task can be difficult, as Professor Field observes, given that it is
difficult to generalize about whether custodial parents or noncustodial parents
are typically more sophisticated.
See, Field, Tax Elections & Private
Bargaining, supra note 13, at 41–42.
246. The mechanics of the rules proposed in this Article, see supra Part
IV.A.3.iii, can be more fully illustrated with several examples. In the first
example (Example 1), assume the noncustodial parent (NCP) is in a higher tax
bracket than the custodial parent (CP). Assume that, at the time of the parents’
divorce, NCP is aware of the election and CP is not. In Example 1, by default,
NCP would be entitled to claim the exemption because NCP is in a higher tax
bracket than CP. See supra text accompanying note 238. However, NCP knows
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that, at tax return time, CP will see information specifying that CP can
unilaterally claim the exemption (and force NCP to not claim the exemption)
unless CP has agreed not to exercise this right. See supra notes 242–43 and
accompanying text. Therefore, at the time of the divorce, NCP will have an
incentive to obtain CP’s agreement to not exercise this right. In the process, CP
will learn about the election (from NCP), and, thus, CP will be in a position to
demand greater support in exchange for his or her agreement not the exercise
this right. In the second example (Example 2), assume the custodial parent
(CP) is in a higher tax bracket than the noncustodial parent (NCP). Assume
that, at the time of the parents’ divorce, neither NCP nor CP is aware of the
election, and, thus, they do not mention it in their divorce agreement. Further,
in Example 2, assume the parties do not see information about the election on
tax returns and prepare their returns in an uninformed manner. As it happens,
NCP claims the exemption and CP does not claim the exemption. In Example 2,
by default, CP would be entitled to claim the exemption because CP is in a
higher tax bracket than NCP. See supra text accompanying note 238. Further,
in Example 2, assuming the parties have not affirmatively checked boxes on
their returns to opt out of this default treatment, the default rule would still
apply. See supra note 243. Thus, the parties would have filed incorrect tax
returns because CP should have claimed the exemption rather than NCP.
Because the individuals reported the wrong tax treatment, they could later
amend their tax returns, or the IRS could audit their returns and correct the
mistake. In the third example (Example 3), assume the noncustodial parent
(NCP) is in a higher tax bracket than the custodial parent (CP). Assume that,
at the time of the parents’ divorce, neither NCP nor CP is aware of the election.
Further, in Example 3, assume the parties do not see information about the
election on tax returns and prepare their returns in an uninformed manner. As
it happens, CP claims the exemption and NCP does not claim the exemption. In
Example 3, by default, NCP would be entitled to claim the exemption because
NCP is in a higher tax bracket than CP. See supra text accompanying note 238.
Further, in Example 3, assuming that CP has not affirmatively exercised his or
her right to elect to claim the exemption and, thereby, opt out of this default
treatment, the default rule would still apply. See supra text accompanying
notes 242–43. Thus, the parties would have filed incorrect tax returns because
NCP should have claimed the exemption rather than CP. Because the
individuals reported the wrong tax treatment, they could later amend their tax
returns, or the IRS could audit their returns and correct the mistake. One
might object to the results of Example 3 on the grounds that it subverts the goal
of allowing the custodial parent to benefit from the exemption. Four responses
to this objection are worth noting. First, providing more information to
taxpayers, as discussed below in Part IV.B, will decrease the likelihood that
Example 3 will occur because the custodial parent will be more informed about
his or her rights to unilaterally claim the exemption. Second, if the taxpayers
are unsophisticated and are in the same tax bracket, the custodial parent is
entitled to the exemption by default which further protects the interests of
custodial parents. See supra note 241. Third, under the facts of Example 3,
rather than correct both tax returns (allowing NCP to claim the exemption and
not allowing CP to claim the exemption) so as to decrease NCP’s tax liability
and increase CP’s tax liability, the IRS could determine the appropriate
aggregate decrease in the parents’ tax liability and apply that to CP’s taxes.
For example, assume CP is in a 15% marginal tax bracket with or without the
exemption, and assume NCP is in a 25% marginal tax bracket with or without
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iv. Forward-Looking Elections that Affect Taxpayers
With Divergent Interests
The election under § 362(e)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue
Code is forward-looking and can affect taxpayers with
divergent interests. As described previously, if a shareholder
contributes built-in loss property to a corporation and the tax
loss is not recognized at the time of the contribution, the
built-in loss will be preserved for future recognition.247 In
particular, either the contributing shareholder will hold stock
in the corporation with a built-in loss so that the shareholder
will recognize a tax loss upon a future sale of the stock, or the
corporation will hold the asset with a built-in loss so that the
corporation will recognize a tax loss upon a future sale of the
asset.248 Under current law, if no election is made to the
contrary, the built-in loss is preserved in the shareholder’s
stock, but, if the corporation and shareholder file an election
under § 362(e)(2)(C), the built-in loss will be preserved in the
asset held by the corporation.249
Whether making the election will reduce the
shareholder’s and corporation’s aggregate tax burden depends
on events unknown at the time the election must be filed. For
example, the pros and cons of making the election depend on
when the corporation sells the asset, when the shareholder
sells the stock, and the amount of future income earned by
the shareholder and the corporation. Thus, the election
under § 362(e)(2)(C) is a forward-looking election, and, as long
as the corporation is owned by more than one shareholder,
the election affects taxpayers whose interests diverge.250
the exemption. Assume the amount of the exemption is $3700. The aggregate
reduction in taxes (in other words, the amount by which the parents’ total taxes
would have been lower if NCP had claimed the exemption rather than CP) is
$3700 x 25% - $3700 x 15% = $925 - $555 = $370. The $370 could be refunded
entirely to CP. Fourth, replacing the current rules with a mandatory rule under
which only the custodial parent can take the exemption would both protect
custodial parents and make it so that an unsophisticated couple who did not use
the election advantageously was not disadvantaged compared to a sophisticated
couple.
247. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part I.E.
250. The shareholder who contributes the property may benefit more,
individually, from a higher stock basis, while the other shareholders would
benefit more, individually, if the corporation had a higher basis in the asset.
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Given the forward-looking nature of the election,
applying a tailored default rule would be costly and difficult.
Applying such a default rule would require the IRS to
determine, as of the election’s due date, what the taxpayers
expected regarding the future income of the shareholder and
corporation and other future events.
Therefore, it is advisable to use an untailored default rule
that minimizes the shareholder’s and corporation’s aggregate
tax liability in the majority of cases. Without empirical
evidence, it is not entirely clear whether such a rule would
preserve the built-in loss at the corporate level or shareholder
level. However, it is plausible that an untailored default rule
would preserve the loss at the corporate level (the opposite of
the current default rule). Stated another way, in many (and
perhaps most) cases, the corporation would obtain more of a
tax benefit from a higher basis in the asset than the tax
benefit the shareholder would obtain from a higher basis in
the stock.251
If the default rule is reversed so that the corporation
obtains the higher basis instead of the contributing
shareholder, it may be desirable to ensure that the
contributing shareholder receives a significant portion of the
economic benefit of the tax losses and deductions taken by the
corporation, given that the economic loss in the contributed
property accrued while held by the shareholder. If more than
one shareholder own the corporation, tax losses taken by the
corporation may benefit all shareholders (not just the
contributing shareholder). In order to achieve the goal of
providing more benefit to the contributing shareholder, the
election could be designed to give the contributing
shareholder the unilateral right to opt out of the default
treatment. By providing notice to the corporation before the
due date of the shareholder’s first tax return following the
Thus, if the corporation has more than one owner, the interest of the
contributing shareholder diverges from the interests of the noncontributing
shareholders. If the corporation has only one owner, the election affects
taxpayers whose interests are aligned; specifically, it affects the contributing
shareholder and the corporation that is wholly owned by that contributing
shareholder.
251. This is especially likely to be the case if the asset is depreciable by the
corporation so that a higher tax basis entitles the corporation to greater
depreciation deductions.
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property contribution and by including a copy of this notice
with his or her tax return, the shareholder could opt to retain
a higher basis in the stock and require the corporation to take
a lower basis in the asset. The shareholder could make this
election unless the parties explicitly agreed otherwise. If the
parties determine that a higher corporate level basis would
minimize aggregate tax liability, other shareholders in the
corporation could provide an economic benefit to the
contributing shareholder in exchange for his or her
agreement to not elect out of the default treatment. Finally,
to ensure that the contributing shareholder is aware of the
election, tax return forms could provide relevant information
as described in the next section.
B. Informing Taxpayers of an Election
As discussed in the preceding section, designing favorable
default rules can mitigate a tax election’s bias against
unsophisticated taxpayers. In addition, as discussed in this
part, including further information about available elections
in tax return forms could assist unsophisticated taxpayers.252
While this information could cause tax revenue loss if
unsophisticated taxpayers make more informed election
decisions, concerns about fairness should outweigh
considerations of tax revenue given that additional revenue
would be forgone merely as a result of trapping fewer unwary
taxpayers.
Lengthy descriptions of all available elections would
undoubtedly overwhelm taxpayers and remain unread.
However, technological developments offer a potential
solution to this problem.
In particular, tax return
preparation software (including free IRS provided programs)
could (and in some cases already does) ask preliminary
questions and, based on the answers provided, only display
information that may be relevant.253 For example, the tax
preparation software would only display information about
the election related to alimony if a taxpayer answered yes to a
252. See Maguire & Zimet, supra note 13, at 1288.
253. For example, at least one tax return preparation programs asks if the
taxpayer owned a home at any time during the year, and, if the taxpayer
answers affirmatively, the program prompts the taxpayer to provide
information relevant to the tax treatment of homeowners.
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preliminary inquiry regarding whether he or she had been
divorced.
Finally, providing additional information to taxpayers is
most effective for elections that are due at the same time as
tax returns because the information can be contained on
return forms and in return preparation software. If an
election is due prior to a return, the IRS’s options for alerting
taxpayers to the election are limited. Material on the IRS
website could describe the election, but, if taxpayers do not
know an election exists, they will have no reason to search for
information about it. Thus, the recommendation to inform
taxpayers is unavoidably linked to the recommendation that
elections should be due at the same time as a tax return, as
discussed in the next section.
C. Election Deadlines
Regarding timing, later filing deadlines would promote
fairness because more unsophisticated taxpayers could
discover that an election exists.254 Particularly for elections
that are currently due before the taxpayer’s return, delaying
the deadline until the return’s due date could reduce bias
against unsophisticated taxpayers for two reasons. First,
even an unsophisticated taxpayer who is ignorant of an
election’s existence will likely be aware of the obligation to
file a return and, in the context of seeking assistance with
return preparation, the taxpayer would be more likely to
learn about and obtain advice regarding an election.255
Second, establishing the return filing deadline as the due
date for an election would make it possible to include
information about the election on return forms and in return
preparation software in order to enlighten unsophisticated
taxpayers. In the case of most elections, the due date already
coincides with the deadline for filing returns.256 However,
this is not the case for all elections. For example, the entity
classification election often must be filed before the due date
for the entity’s first tax return.257
254.
255.
256.
257.
when

See Lyon, supra note 201, at 594.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Helvey & Stetson, supra note 13, at 338.
See supra Part I.D. It is not clear why the entity classification is due
it is. When the Treasury proposed the current regulations, some

CAUBLE FINAL

2013]

7/23/2013 9:23 PM

TAX ELECTIONS

481

While later filing deadlines promote fairness, they also
result in additional lost tax revenue. Moreover, unlike
adopting favorable default rules and providing taxpayers with
additional information, delayed filing deadlines would cause
reduced tax revenue not merely because unsophisticated
taxpayers made more favorable elections. Rather, delayed
filing deadlines for forward-looking elections could also cause
revenue loss because sophisticated taxpayers would make
more favorable elections at a time when they possess more
information that bears on the pros and cons of a given
election. To use the entity classification election as an
example,
a
given
classification’s
advantages
and
disadvantages depend, in part, on the economic results
realized by the entity.258 If regulations granted taxpayers
more time to make a decision regarding entity classification,
taxpayers would possess greater information about the
economic results of the entity, and they would be able to
make election decisions that more effectively reduce tax
liability. In other words, more time would not simply allow
unsophisticated taxpayers to correct their mistakes regarding
tax law but also allow sophisticated taxpayers to correct
decisions based upon mistaken predictions.259 Consequently,
commentators suggested that taxpayers should be allowed to make
classification elections with their first tax returns. The Treasury did not heed
this recommendation and, regarding its reason for dismissing the
recommendation, stated simply, “Treasury and the IRS continue to believe that
it is appropriate to determine an entity’s classification at the time that it begins
its operations.” See 61 Fed. Reg. 66584, 66586. (1996). It may be that the
Treasury spurned a later deadline because of the increased tax planning
opportunities it would create. See infra notes 258 and accompanying text. The
election under § 83(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides another example of
an election with an early deadline. This election determines the tax treatment
of certain transfers of property made to service providers and must be filed no
later than thirty days after property is transferred. I.R.C. § 83(b)(2) (2012). A
later filing deadline for this election may not be feasible because it would
provide taxpayers with too great of an opportunity to make tax revenuereducing elections. If this is the case, serious consideration ought to be given to
replacing the election with mandatory treatment.
258. See supra Part I.D.
259. The revised deadline would provide that the initial classification election
was not due until the entity filed its first tax return. Any subsequent changes
to elections could still be due within seventy-five days of their effective dates.
The revenue effect of this change might not be particularly large. Even if the
due date is delayed until the tax return date, the taxpayer only possesses
information about the entity’s operations for a little more than its first year.
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a balanced approach to filing deadlines may be warranted.
One way to adopt a balanced approach would involve delaying
the deadline for an election until the due date for filing a tax
return while, at the same time, increasing the persistence of
the election, as discussed in Part IV.D. below.260
Another way to institute a balanced approach would
combine early filing deadlines with more readily available
relief for unsophisticated taxpayers to file late elections. As
discussed above,261 a taxpayer is unlikely to obtain permission
to file a late election unless he or she evaluated the election
prior to its original deadline and always intended to make a
given election.
These current rules offer little or no
assistance to unsophisticated taxpayers who, prior to an
election’s deadline, may have had no intention with respect to
the election whatsoever.
The current rules do serve a practical purpose by helping
to ensure that taxpayers do not use information obtained
since an election’s deadline to make a more favorable election
than what they would have made based on information
available as of the original deadline. To prevent a taxpayer
from using hindsight in this manner, a court or the IRS must
determine what election the taxpayer would have made based
only on information available as of the election’s due date.
This task is fairly straightforward if the taxpayer can
demonstrate that, prior to the election’s deadline, he or she
clearly revealed an intention to elect the same tax treatment
that he or she now seeks to elect. For example, the taxpayer
could present memoranda from advisors stating that the
The election would still have a significant forward-looking component. In other
words, the pros and cons of making the election would still depend on the
results of the business in future years which will be unknown by the taxpayer
at the time the election is made. Nevertheless, some tax revenue may be
relinquished, and the tax revenue forgone is not merely a consequence of
mitigating the bias against unsophisticated taxpayers but also results from
expanding tax planning opportunities available to sophisticated taxpayers.
260. Increasing persistence is not always a viable option because some
elections are irrevocable and thus, already persist indefinitely. The § 83(b)
election discussed above is an example of an election that is irrevocable in most
circumstances. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(f) (2012) (regarding revocability of the
election), and see supra note 257 for further discussion of this election. For
elections with early deadlines that already persist indefinitely, policymakers
ought to consider the possibility of replacing the election with mandatory
treatment.
261. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
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election should be made, and the taxpayer could explain that
a miscommunication regarding who would file the paperwork
was the only reason the election was not timely filed. By
contrast, if a taxpayer did not even consider an election prior
to its deadline, the court or the IRS would need to examine
information available as of the election’s original due date to
attempt to determine what the taxpayer would have wanted
if he or she had considered the election. For the entity
classification election, for instance, courts or the IRS would
consider evidence bearing on the taxpayer’s likely predictions,
as of the election’s due date, regarding the future profitability
of the business. The court or the IRS would then decide,
based on this information, what election an informed
taxpayer would have made. Completing this task would be
challenging for the same reasons that applying a tailored
default rule to a forward-looking tax election is difficult.262
Both exercises require the court or the IRS to place itself in
the position of the taxpayer as of an earlier date and decide
what a more sophisticated taxpayer would have elected.
Nevertheless, the task of providing late filing relief to
unsophisticated taxpayers will not always be insurmountable,
and, when it is feasible to provide relief, courts or the IRS
should not hesitate to do so. In some cases involving forwardlooking elections, a taxpayer could prove that he or she would
have made a different election based on information available
as of the election’s due date, and he or she failed to do so only
as a result of a lack of understanding of the election’s tax
consequences.263 A flexible doctrine could allow courts or the
IRS to provide relief when taxpayers are able to meet this
burden.264 In addition, applicable rules could be reformed to
262. See supra Parts IV.A.3.ii, IV.A.3.iv.
263. For instance, in some cases, the taxpayer’s lack of sophistication will be
obvious. Also, it could be the case that a different election would have always
been more favorable as long as the taxpayer’s business was expected to be
profitable and the taxpayer can convincingly show that he or she anticipated
profits. If the taxpayer can show that the economic outcome of the business was
expected, it would be natural to infer that the taxpayer failed to make a
different election because of misinformation about tax law. Thus, this taxpayer
is not attempting to benefit from hindsight because he or she would have made
a different election had he or she understood the tax consequences.
264. The difference between a flexible doctrine that grants relief for late
filing and a tailored default rule is significant. In the case of a tailored default
rule, any time taxpayers failed to make an affirmative election, courts or the
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more readily grant relief for late filing of backward-looking
elections. In the case of backward-looking elections, it will
often be clear that the taxpayer is not attempting to use
hindsight because all relevant information was already
available as of the election’s original due date. For example,
assume the default rule for the dependency exemption
remains what it is currently so that, by default, the custodial
parent claims the exemption.265 Further, assume that, in the
year 2012, a noncustodial parent was in a higher tax bracket
than a custodial parent so that the divorced couple could save
taxes if they opted out of the default rule. The couple is
unsophisticated and does not adequately consider the election
before filing their tax returns for 2012. Sometime later, they
discover the availability of the election and seek relief to
amend their 2012 returns to opt out of default treatment.
The couple would be able to convincingly show that opting out
of the default rule was the most beneficial choice based only
on information available at the time the original returns were
filed. Therefore, existing rules could be reformed to more
readily grant relief in such a situation. For administrative
reasons, some time limit should be placed on taxpayers’
ability to change backward-looking elections. Similar to the
current rules for the standard deduction, taxpayers could be
allowed to change backward-looking tax elections on amended
returns filed within the period of the statute of limitations for
claiming a tax refund.266 To address any concerns about
increased administrative costs, the IRS could charge a fee for

IRS would need to determine what treatment would have appeared favorable
based on information available as of the original due date for the election. With
a flexible doctrine, on the other hand, courts or the IRS only need to answer this
question in cases in which taxpayers can present evidence that convinces the
court or the IRS that a given tax treatment clearly would have appeared
favorable based on information available as of the election’s original due date.
265. For further discussion of this election, see supra Part I.C. If the current
default rule were replaced with a tailored default rule, as proposed above in
Part IV.A.3.iii, the taxpayers in the example discussed in the text above would
have filed returns incorrectly. Under a tailored default rule, if the parties do
not consider the election and do not take steps to opt out of default treatment,
the noncustodial parent would be entitled to claim the exemption in this
example. If, as in the example above, the parties file returns in a manner that
is not consistent with this treatment, they should be able to file amended
returns to correct their error.
266. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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changing elections in an amended return.267 This method for
addressing cost concerns is less severe than a complete loss of
ability to make a favorable election.
D. Persistence of Elections
As discussed in the preceding section, delaying the filing
deadlines for elections
can reduce bias
against
unsophisticated taxpayers. However, delaying deadlines also
leads to lost tax revenue. Furthermore, at least in the context
of forward-looking elections, some additional revenue is
relinquished because sophisticated taxpayers engage in more
effective tax planning. Thus, with respect to timing of
elections, a balanced approach is appropriate and could be
implemented by delaying the deadline for an election until
the due date for filing a tax return while, at the same time,
increasing the persistence of the election. This can be
demonstrated in the context of the entity classification
election.
Regarding persistence, under current law, entity
classification elections can be changed every five years.268
Furthermore, if an entity is initially classified by default,
there is no limit on how soon it could make a first change to
its classification.269 Also, if an entity files an election that is
effective as of the date the entity was formed (an initial
classification election), there is no restriction on how soon the
entity could elect to make a first change to its classification.270
Sophisticated taxpayers can take advantage of this
flexibility to classify an entity differently during different
periods of time in order to obtain the most advantageous
possible tax consequences. For example, assume a group of
tax-exempt entities plan to invest in a real estate fund that
intends to buy and sell for-sale housing (such as
condominiums) in the United States. The tax-exempt entities
anticipate that the fund will generate tax losses in early years
267. See Lyon, supra note 201, at 594. This would not be unprecedented.
Under current law, for example, taxpayers are charged filing fees when they
submit requests for private letter rulings. These fees pass administrative costs
onto taxpayers.
268. See supra Part I.D.
269. See supra Part I.D.
270. See supra Part I.D.
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as it ramps up its business. After an initial period of
generating losses, the fund is expected to generate tax gains.
If these expectations are realized, the tax-exempt entities will
obtain the most beneficial tax treatment by investing through
an entity that is treated as a partnership in early years.271 In
later years when the business is producing tax gains, the taxexempt entities could obtain more advantageous tax
treatment by investing through an entity treated as a
corporation and funded, in part, with debt.272 Consequently,
assuming the tax-exempt entities invest through an entity
that is treated as a partnership by default, the tax-exempt
entities will initially refrain from filing a classification
election so that they may benefit from partnership treatment
in early years. A couple years later, the tax-exempt entities
will file an election to treat the entity as a corporation going
forward. The five-year limitation will not preclude the taxexempt entities from changing the classification of the entity
because the entity’s original default classification did not
trigger the five-year limitation.

271. If the entity is treated as a partnership in the loss years, each taxexempt entity will be allocated its share of unrelated business losses generated
by the partnership. Each tax-exempt entity can deduct the resulting losses
against other unrelated business taxable income, subject to certain limitations.
I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(a) (2012). By contrast, if the
entity were treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, losses that it
recognized would not flow through to the tax-exempt entities.
272. In years in which the fund generates gains, if the tax-exempt entities
invested through a partnership, they would be subject to tax at thirty-five
percent on all gains from sale of housing by the fund because such gains would
constitute income subject to the UBIT. For further discussion, see supra note
87. By contrast, if the tax-exempt entities invest through a U.S. entity treated
as a corporation and funded in part with debt, the tax-exempt entities will earn
income that is characterized as dividend income, capital gain income, and
interest income. The tax-exempt entities will generally not be subject to tax on
this income. For further discussion, see supra note 88. This result should not
be affected by § 512(b)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code (a provision that
subjects tax-exempt entities to tax on interest paid by certain controlled
entities) as long as no tax-exempt entity’s interest in the corporation is more
than fifty-percent. Furthermore, while the U.S. entity treated as a corporation
is subject to entity-level tax generally at a rate of thirty-five percent, this
entity’s taxable income is reduced by interest expenses paid on its debt
financing, subject to certain limitations. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 163(a), 163(j). Thus,
the aggregate tax liability of the fund and the tax-exempt entities can be
reduced by treating the fund as a corporation and financing the fund, in part,
with debt.
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The persistence of the classification election would
increase if the five-year time period were lengthened or if
classifications by default and initial classification elections
started the five-year (or greater) time period during which
classification elections were disallowed.
If lawmakers
instituted these changes, taxpayers likely would attempt to
plan around the new restrictions. In particular, taxpayers
would enter into actual transactions that replicate the tax
consequences that follow from an elective change to an
entity’s classification. In the context of the real estate fund
described in the preceding paragraph, for instance, the taxexempt entities could, as above, refrain from filing an election
so that the entity is treated as a partnership for the first two
years. If default classification triggered the five-year (or
greater) limitation, the tax-exempt entities could not
electively change the classification of the existing
partnership. However, they could cause the partnership to:
(i) contribute all of its assets to a newly formed entity treated
as a corporation for tax purposes and (ii) distribute the stock
in the new corporation to the tax-exempt entities in
liquidation of the partnership. The tax-exempt entities could
claim that these transactions resulted in the same tax
consequences as an elective change to the entity’s
classification.273 Thus, for the suggested reform to have any
273. If the tax-exempt entities elect to change the fund’s classification from
partnership to corporation, the parties will be treated as if: (i) first, the
partnership contributed all of its assets and liabilities to a newly formed
corporation in exchange for stock in the corporation and, (ii) second, the
partnership liquidated by distributing stock in the corporation to the taxexempt entities. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1). As a result of these deemed
transactions, the parties generally should not recognize any gain or loss. I.R.C.
§§ 351, 731 (providing for non-recognition on the deemed contribution of assets
to the corporation and providing generally for non-recognition on the deemed
distribution of stock by the partnership, respectively). Likewise, similar
treatment should follow if: (i) the partnership actually contributed all of its
assets to a newly formed corporation, and (ii) the partnership subsequently
liquidated by distributing stock in the corporation to the tax-exempt entities.
At the time of step (i), the partnership likely holds assets with built-in gains.
However, generally, the partnership should not recognize these gains. Id. § 351.
This is true at least as long as the IRS does not successfully argue that the
transaction lacks a business purpose and should be ineligible for nonrecognition treatment under § 351. Likewise, when the partnership distributes
stock in the corporation to the tax-exempt entities, the partnership and the taxexempt entities generally should not recognize gain or loss. Id. § 731.
Alternatively, the IRS might challenge the claimed results of these transactions
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real impact, other measures would have to supplement the
increased persistence.
These measures would prevent
taxpayers from easily circumventing the restrictions on
elective changes.274
If a later deadline was adopted in tandem with increased
persistence, sophisticated taxpayers would benefit from some
additional information when making the original
classification decision. In particular, taxpayers would be
aware of the results of the entity’s operations from the time it
was formed until the due date for filing the first tax return.
However, taxpayers would have less ability to revise entity
classification in the future in response to changed economic
circumstances. The increased persistence, thus, leads to
additional tax revenue collection that, at least partially,
offsets any tax revenue lost as a result of later filing
deadlines.
Finally, increased persistence could, at the same time,
aggravate the bias against unsophisticated taxpayers. If such
taxpayers fail to make a beneficial classification decision at
the outset, they will be burdened by the negative
consequences for a longer period of time.275 For this reason, a
rule providing for increased persistence might be adopted in
combination with rules allowing taxpayers more leeway to
revoke or revise tax elections that were mistaken from the
outset. Such rules would mirror the provisions for late filing
relief discussed above.276

by asserting that the new entity should be treated as a mere continuation of the
old entity for tax purposes.
274. For example, courts could apply a stronger business purpose
requirement when determining whether property contributions receive nonrecognition treatment under § 351. As a result, when the partnership
contributed its assets to a newly formed corporation as an attempt to plan
around the five-year rule, the partnership likely would be required to recognize
any built-in gains in its assets. Thus, the tax-exempt entities would recognize
significant income subject to the UBIT when the assets were contributed to the
corporation. To avoid this result, the parties likely would treat the fund as a
corporation from the outset (and, as a result, forgo the tax savings resulting
from treating the fund as a partnership in its early, loss-generating years).
275. See Lyon, supra note 201, at 594.
276. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Tax elections are harmful. They cause tax revenue
erosion, unfairness, and complexity. Despite their numerous
flaws, elections are, and likely will continue to be, prominent
features of tax law. Given the ubiquitous nature of tax
elections, their parameters should be carefully crafted so as to
mitigate the damage that they cause.
This Article
recommends a number of measures that could moderate the
negative consequences of elections.
First, default rules
should be taxpayer favorable. Second, steps should be taken
to alert taxpayers to available elections. Third, if at all
possible, elections should not be due until a taxpayer is
required to file a tax return, and, in some cases,
unsophisticated taxpayers should be more freely allowed to
file late elections. Finally, in some cases it might be
advisable to increase the persistence of elections while, at the
same time, more readily grant relief to unsophisticated
taxpayers who can show that a given election was ill-advised
from the start.
Many of these recommendations will promote fairness
but, at the same time, lead to additional tax revenue loss.
However, at least when additional tax revenue is surrendered
merely as a result of trapping fewer unwary taxpayers,
fairness ought to be prioritized because lost tax revenue can
be recouped in fairer ways. If relinquishing the additional
tax revenue is untenable, serious consideration should be
given to eliminating an election entirely and mandating the
less favorable treatment for everyone rather than continuing
to impose the less favorable treatment on only the illinformed.

